


**INTERNATIONAL  
HELSINKI  
FEDERATION FOR  
HUMAN RIGHTS**



# **Minority Rights and the Freedom of Religion in Balkan Countries**

**Herceg-Novi, September 24-26 1999**

**Seminar Report**

Florian Bieber

*A Multi-national Program of NGO Human Rights Cooperation  
In the Framework of the Royaumont Process*

*European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights*

## **Minority Rights and the Freedom of Religion in Balkan Countries<sup>1</sup>**

In the framework of the Royaumont Process, a regional seminar gathered well over 100 participants in Herceg-Novi, Montenegro, from September 24-26 to discuss the state and protection of national and religious minorities in South East Europe. Human Rights activists from national Helsinki Committees in South East and central Europe and other Human Rights organisations, and representatives of international organisations active in the area (OSCE, UN), met at the seminar to develop a regional approach to understanding and responding to the often precarious situation of national minorities and religious communities. A number of Montenegrin human rights activists, intellectuals and representatives of national minority groups and religious communities also helped to reach an in depth understanding of this republic and illustrated it as a case study for the better understanding of the situation of national minorities and religious rights. The meeting was organised by the Montenegrin Helsinki Committee for Human Rights and the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), in co-operation with Greek Helsinki Monitor.

South Eastern Europe and its neighbouring countries often face similar challenges with regard to national minorities. Two reoccurring types of difficulties can be identified. In a number of countries, the minorities have received adequate legal protection, but still suffer from the imperfect implementation of these safeguards. In addition, most legal guarantees for minorities are still new and have either not yet been fully implemented, still lack detail, or raise new, yet unanswered, questions. This situation is most commonly found in the Northern Balkans and adjacent countries, while the overall situation tends to be most dire in the Southern Balkans. Although some minorities have been recognised in most countries, many remain legally un- or under-protected and are far from equal to the predominant nation.

The role of religion remains a difficult point in the Balkans and its neighbouring countries. In most states the governments have made attempts to establish the predominant religion as a formal or informal state-church, thus jeopardising the rights of other, small religious communities. The smaller religious groups, either connected to long established groups in the region or religions which gained a new following since the end of communism, have often encountered difficulties in registering and even in the free assembly of its believers. While most of the other developments in minority and religious rights can be seen in a different light in Western Europe, this problem of small religious communities can be identified on a Europe-wide scale.

Similarly, the plight of the Roma throughout South East Europe, and indeed throughout Europe as a whole, remains the most consistently difficult and recurring challenge on most of the continent. Insufficient access to education, discrimination in employment from private and public sectors, as well as open xenophobia and racism towards Roma are prevalent in all the countries under discussion at the conference.

---

<sup>1</sup> In this report the term “Balkans” and “Southeastern Europe” are used interchangeably to cover the countries discussed during the conference. In addition, a number of countries were also mentioned which fall out of most definitions of this area. They are only mentioned separately, if developments in these countries differ from those in Southeastern Europe. The positions and recommendations described here do not necessarily reflect the opinion of all the participants or of the author of this report. Further information on particular aspects, described in the report, are available from the respective national Helsinki Committees.

The conference provided the opportunity to exchange different approaches to similar problems and thus enable activists to have a more comprehensive and coherent approach to the challenges which remain in South East Europe, often independent from state borders. In addition, the exchange with representatives from international organisations and the co-ordination amongst activists will improve the usage of international mechanisms to tackle the challenge of national and religious minority rights in South East Europe.

## 1. Minority Rights

### *a. Current Trends in Minority Rights in the Balkans*

Minorities tend to escape an acceptable working **definition**. While some definitions remain too broad and thus offer little specificity, narrow definitions tend to be exclusive, which is problematic for minorities. Despite the difficulties in defining minorities in law and academia, minorities can usually be identified with relative ease in each particular case. No country in South East Europe (as indeed in the rest of Europe) is without minorities.

Generally, two trends with regard to minority rights can be observed. In a large number of countries, and particularly in the Northern Balkans, a comprehensive system of the legal protection of minorities has been introduced. Here the biggest problems stem from the difference between formal and informal rights. On the other hand, a number of countries have not legally committed themselves to the adequate protection of minorities; ranging from inadequate safeguards to the non-recognition of the minority.

In Northern Balkans and adjacent countries, the most accentuated problem of discrimination is the situation of the **Roma** (see 1c). However, other minorities also suffer from discrimination, especially during a repressive and (semi-)authoritarian political system; as has been the case of Hungarians in Slovakia and continues to be the case for Serbs in Croatia.

The most extreme case of **non-recognition of minorities** can be found in the Southern Balkans. Greece officially recognises only the “Muslims” of Western Thrace as a minority group, based on the Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey from 1923. However, even this recognised minority is subject to the heavy-handed approach of the government and frequent interference into the affairs of the community; while its members are denied the right to a Turkish identity. All other groups remain officially unrecognised.

The case of Croatia illustrates **discrepancies** that remain present throughout the region **between the legal framework and reality**. While the rights of national minorities are relatively well legislated, the situation of Serbs in particular remains dire. During the years of the war (1991-1995) approx. 10,000 houses of Serbs outside the war zone were blown up. Serbs continue to be discriminated against in employment, housing and by the police. While in other countries differences between legal protection and treatment of minorities can be observed, the discrepancy is considerably larger in Croatia, largely due to the absence of political will on the side of the government to address the issue. The authorities’ behaviour towards the

minority suggests either assimilation or departure as alternatives for members of the minority. Similarly, in the Republika Srpska, the legal framework remains largely cosmetic and minorities encounter broad discrimination, often a heritage of the war, i.e. the prevention of the return of refugees to the RS and the absence of functioning mosques. Further, in Serbia the inadequacies of the legal framework bear no relationship to the flagrant violence of minority rights. In addition, Serbia demonstrates that a high degree of centralisation proves detrimental for minority rights, especially when government legitimacy is not based on protecting the interests of minorities.

The current legislation on national minorities in most countries is relatively new, and often encounters problems. In Hungary, for example, the new law on local self-government of national minorities allows institutional representation to everyone who wishes to vote or run for office. While this avoids a state-defined limitation to membership of national minorities, it can lead to the so-called “**cuckoo-effect**” whereby non-minority members take advantage of the system for personal political or material gain. In Hungary, the simultaneous general elections and minority local self-government elections exacerbate this danger, as many people are able to vote in the ballot for minority representation without making the conscious decision to participate in elections for minority self-government.

In a number of countries minorities do not enjoy any legal protection. This is frequently the case for “**new minorities**” who become a minority through the dissolution of larger states (or their ethnic division). In the case of Bosnia, except for Muslims, Croats and Serbs, minorities are only marginally protected by law. Furthermore, the minority population of the respective entity (Muslims and Croats in the Republika Srpska, Serbs in the Federation of Bosnia) are *de-facto* second class citizens and remain excluded from political, social and economic spheres. In the case of Serbia, Serb refugees from outside of Serbia could be added to these “new minorities” as they are systematically excluded from housing, social benefits, education and employment.

In a number of cases, minorities also show little respect for **minorities within the minority** (i.e. women and religious minorities) or the territory in which the minority dominates. This can manifest itself through attempted assimilation, discrimination or segregation; for example the pressure from the Albanian community in Gostivar (Macedonia) to assimilate Roma; or Turks in Greek Thrace to assimilate Pomaks and Muslim Roma.

Throughout South East Europe there is a tendency to **apply the same laws differently** when dealing with dominant nation(s) and minorities. In Bulgaria for example, the constitution bans parties along ethnic or national lines. While the founding of a predominantly Turkish party was eventually allowed, Roma parties were frequently denied registration on the basis of this constitutional provision.

#### *b. Approaches and Solutions to Problems in Minority Rights*

The difference in legal protection and the social, economic and political inequalities between minorities and the majority, call for a more pro-active approach to minority rights beyond legal measures to ensure equality. One approach would be to promote **affirmative action** for minorities to combat “quiet discrimination.”

NGOs, minority groups and international organisations must **co-ordinate their activities** in the sphere of minority rights. Because there are a number of different international organisations working on related aspects of minority rights, there is a need for co-operation in order to avoid the unnecessary duplication of efforts.

There is a need for a **central point of information gathering** on the status of minorities throughout the region, which is publicly accessible and relies on information from all possible sources.

NGOs have to utilise the channels for input open to them in **international organisations**, such as with the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.

### *c. The Challenge of Roma Rights*

Of all the countries in South East Europe, Roma were described as the, or at least one of the most precarious minority groups. Many similarities can be observed in the treatment of Roma from a legal, political, and social perspective throughout the region. The 12 to 15 Million Roma are generally marginalised in society and suffer from the absence of adequate legal protection, unequal access to education and employment, overt and covert discrimination, and outright hate crimes.

The number of Roma in South East Europe remains difficult to determine, as most official figures are considerably lower than the real number. This is mostly due to the reluctance of a large number of Roma to register as such for the fear of discrimination.

In most countries, a large number of Roma children are unable to attend school, as their precarious economic situation leaves them hungry and in need of work to survive. In addition, many Roma children experience open discrimination in school, including beatings, which often lead to withdrawal from the **educational system**. Furthermore, a number of countries, such as Bosnia and Montenegro, do not insist on mandatory schooling in the case of Roma. Many countries informally segregate Roma children from others through “special schools” for children with learning difficulties. In most cases these schools are largely attended by Roma children. Causes for this segregation lie frequently in the types of testing done to determine eligibility for “normal schools.” Thus, most Roma children are denied access to an education which would open opportunities to regular employment or further education. An increasing number of Roma leaders now insist on ending the segregation of Roma in schools.

**Housing** remains another pressing problem for a large number of Roma. Many settlements do not have adequate water, electricity and public transport facilities. Access to telephones is frequently absent, which is particularly problematic in cases of medical emergencies. In many countries, Roma living in these settlements are subject to forced evictions for the construction of different facilities. The separate housing of Roma also leads to segregated education, where no special schools exist. The schools in predominantly Roma neighbourhoods are mostly under-funded and consequently provide a lower level of education.

Roma are often discriminated against in **employment** by both government and private businesses. Unemployment of Roma in most countries runs at more than 70 %. In areas of ethnic tension between national communities, as in Bosnia, a national key (distribution of public offices and civil service position according to an established

system) seeks to guarantee the rights of the national communities in the political and economic sphere, excluding Roma de facto.

The **authorities'** attitude towards Roma is often problematic. Frequently, Roma receive considerably harsher punishments than non-Roma for the same or similar crimes. When Roma are victimised, the perpetrators often remain free. In dissolving countries (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia), Roma have suffered from difficulties regarding the acquisition of citizenship in the new countries. While most countries have created a legal framework for the protection of minority rights, few have passed a comprehensive program to integrate Roma into society. Even where such programs have been decided upon, as in Bulgaria, their implementation remains doubtful.

In addition to the precarious status of Roma throughout the region, problems of **discrimination within the Roma community** remain; particularly with regard to women and children.

Roma have become particular victims of **national conflicts** in South East Europe. During the wars in former Yugoslavia, Roma were often the victims of ethnic cleansing together with the respective minority, as in the Republika Srpska. In addition, they were often accused of taking sides and discriminated against accordingly. In many cases Roma suffered more from discrimination than the supposed "guilty" nation, due to their weak position and the absence of outside protection. This can be observed in Eastern Slavonia, but also in Kosovo.

Unlike the nations and ethnic groups directly involved in the conflict, Roma were frequently not recognised as refugees from the wars and were thus labelled "**economic migrants**" in Western countries. The living conditions of Roma refugees, particularly from Kosovo, have been extremely precarious.

In all countries, public opinion towards Roma is generally hostile, cutting across national divisions. In a number of countries, for example in Romania, the media engages in hate speech against Roma and thus increases public hostility. In the most extreme cases, these negative **stereotypes** articulated themselves in pogroms and attacks against individual Roma or groups. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but also in Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bulgaria, skinheads and other extreme right-wing **youth groups attack** Roma, resulting in heavy injury and even death. In addition, large-scale programs took place in South East Europe in which entire Roma settlements were attacked, as occurred in Danilovgrad in Montenegro in 1995. The **pogroms**, triggered by a rape committed by a Roma lead to the burning of the Roma settlement. In the aftermath, all Roma had to leave town and only a few Roma have since returned. Police forces in different countries frequently engage in violence and "preventive arrests" against Roma.

#### *d. Approaches and Solutions to Problems of Roma*

NGO's need to **raise awareness** of the situation of Roma in South East Europe in International Organisations. On the local and national level, even more attention needs to be directed to the status of Roma.

Furthermore, NGO's working on aspects of Roma Rights will have to **co-operate** more actively with each other and with **Roma organisations**.

As most discrimination against Roma is carried out informally, it is extremely difficult to prove. One way to raise awareness and address the frequent

**discrimination by the legal system** has been suggested: a comparative study of sentences against Roma and non-Roma for similar crimes might help to reveal the inequalities in legal treatment. Human Rights activists will need to disclose and speak out against all forms of discrimination and in particular address the problem of citizenship for Roma in a number of countries.

## 2. Religious Rights

### *a. Current Trends in Religious Rights in the Balkans*

While the status of national minorities in the Balkans has received broad, if not necessarily well-differentiated, reporting in the international media and attention in international organisations, the situation of religious rights has featured less significantly on the public agenda. A number of similarities between the status of national minorities and religious groups can be detected in most Balkan countries. The dominant nation and religion generally receive privileged status in state structures, while the small communities are generally viewed with suspicion by authorities. However, even these groups do not necessarily demonstrate an adequate tolerance to other minorities or minorities within the groups. In all the countries under consideration here, three problems are widespread. In many countries the dominant religion or other religious groups are instrumentalised for political purposes. In addition, conflict erupts between traditional religious and new religious groups in the region. This conflict can be observed even in countries that did not experience the communist period with “sheltering” from new religious communities until 1989.

Finally, the many religious groups face difficulties with registration as a religious community and freedom of assembly. All these problems are intimately connected to the privileged position granted to one or several “traditional” religious communities.

While there is no international treaty dealing specifically with religious freedom, several international standards do exist. These includes the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, provisions in several other UN special conventions and anti-discrimination provisions in a number of international treaties. To these should be added the OSCE commitments on Freedom of Religion, the jurisprudence of the European Court on Human Rights and the General Comments of the UN Human Rights Committee.

In a large number of countries in South East Europe, the hierarchy of the dominant religious community attempts to **intervene directly in the political sphere**. This might manifest itself through directly supporting either the government or the political opposition or through the articulation of its own political programme. In particular the Serbian Orthodox Church played a pivotal role in promoting nationalist goals in Serbia. However, it appears to have shifted in certain respects recently. While some segments protected Albanians in Kosovo during the mass expulsion of Albanians in early 1999 and addressed the issue of responsibility, large parts of the Church still refuse to acknowledge their role in the wars in former Yugoslavia and advocate separation of the different nations, particularly in the case of Kosovo, where partition and “cantonization” are promoted. Other countries are also exposed to a process of

“**desecularization**” where the church gains a (recognised) role in the political sphere and society.

There is a tendency to accept the “Greek model” of the state, recognising the traditionally **dominant church as the official church**. Greece has frequently been taken to the European Court for Human Rights in respect to religious rights.

In many countries, formal and informal means are used to privilege the dominant church, opposed to either traditional religious minorities or new religious movements. In the case of Croatia, for example, Catholic Churches have been restored since the end of the war, while other religious buildings have only received little support for reconstruction. In addition, believers of other religious groups, especially the Serbian Orthodox Church, are under considerable pressure in small communities. This informal preference can also be identified in statements of government officials, such as the Prime Minister Georgievski of Macedonia, who emphasised the need for an official religion in order to achieve political and economic success. In Greece the link between the state and the Church is emphasised in the constitution, which describes the Greek Orthodox Church as a dominant religion and furthermore elevates internal church regulations to state law, with changes only possible with the approval of the state.

The state often intervenes in **inner-church conflicts** and in the **internal matters of the church**, especially regarding ecclesiastical hierarchies. This pertains particularly to unresolved disputes between Orthodox churches (Serbian Orthodox Church vs. Macedonian Orthodox Church, the split in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Old vs. New Calendarists in Greece).

Often the traditional religious minorities behave with the same degree of **intolerance towards New Religious Movements** (NRM’s), as the dominant church. Furthermore, the support for certain non-dominant religious groups is often focused exclusively on their own rights and not on religious freedom at a universal level.

There is a noticeable tendency of **low public support for religious rights**, especially in the sphere of education. In Croatia only a negligible number of students indicated their interest in participating in non-Catholic religious education. Similarly, in Macedonia, 78 % of children in an opinion poll consider marriages between members of different religious communities undesirable. This poll also highlights the possible links between religious and national groups. Often, both are closely identified. Thus, at times of tension between national groups, overall inter-religious relations may also suffer. Frequently, the New Religious Movements are also subject to harassment on the local level, often more so than by the central government authorities. This “decentralised” discrimination is much more difficult to combat and often manifests itself covertly.

New Religious Movements and religious communities that are new to the region are still viewed with a high degree of **suspicion by the authorities** in all South East European countries. This manifests itself differently from country to country. In some cases, registration of new religious groups must be done at the ministry of interior, not the ministry of religious affairs; thus signifying the state perception of the movements as potential security threats and not on par with already established churches. In Bulgaria, for example, materials of New Religious Movements have been confiscated frequently. In some countries, registration of these groups is rendered extremely difficult or impossible altogether. This is not only of symbolic relevance, but it

prevents the communities from having a legal personality. The absence of this status makes the acquisition of property and other contracts, i.e. employment, impossible. Albania might be considered the most extreme case, where none of the three “traditional” religious communities, the Islamic Community, the Catholic and Orthodox Church possess a legal status or sought to acquire it and thus operate largely in a legal vacuum. In Greece, the long-established Catholic Church has been denied legal personality. Connected, but not limited to the issue of registrations is the issue of restitution, which remains an unresolved issue in many post-communist countries.

The issue of **registration** is also of relevance beyond the Balkans. In Germany, for example, registration as a church is rendered extremely difficult, as such status is connected to a large number of privileges, such as the ability to offer religious education in schools and a share of government-collected church taxes. In the USA, on the other hand, religious communities are offered a similar legal status as other associations, making registration relatively easy. In Great Britain, the status obtainable for churches is either of an association or of a charitable association, with the latter being significantly more difficult to obtain as it is associated with tax reductions. All charitable associations must refrain from political activities. Throughout the Balkans, registering as a religious community is considerably more restrictive than registering as an association. The laws on registration in a number of countries, such as Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania and Bosnia, originate from the Communist era, which was marked by a clear suspicion towards religion. In Greece many of these laws originate from the pre-war Metaxas dictatorship.

Another important issue connected with the freedom of religion is the possibility of **conscientious objection** to military service, which remains problematic in a number of countries in the Balkans.

#### *b. Approaches and Solutions to Problems in Religious Rights*

**Registration** should not be subject to any obstacles as long as religious communities abide by the constitution of the country and do not engage in any illegal activities.

**Inner-church Conflicts** should not be on the agenda of Human Rights organisations unless they concern the infringement of international standards regarding religious rights and the freedom of religion.

NGO's should **co-ordinate** their activities between themselves and with religious groups across borders, as many problems are similar throughout the region.

### 3. The International Framework for addressing Minority and Religious Rights

#### *a. Some aspects of International Protection Mechanisms*

Despite numerous inadequacies of the international legal framework in addressing rights of minorities and religious rights, significant progress has been made in recent years. In particular the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE) have addressed these issues from different angles.

Within the OSCE framework the **High Commissioner on National Minorities** offers an international early warning system in case of tensions arising from minority-majority relations in OSCE countries. The aim of the High Commissioner is to prevent the escalation of ethnic conflict at the earliest possible stage. In South East Europe, the High Commissioner has been active in Croatia, Albania, Romania and Macedonia. Additionally, he has been reporting on the status of Roma through the OSCE. While the mandate limits the High Commissioner's areas of intervention, such as wars in disintegrating Yugoslavia, the early warning aspect calls for intervention at a similar stage at which NGOs can become active and potentially ease tensions.

The **Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities** of the Council of Europe offers a legal, international mechanism to address the status of national minorities. Although the convention in many cases lacks details, it offers standards on which basis the policies of countries can be evaluated. It facilitates the work of NGOs in so far as it offers them an international forum to communicate problems of minority rights to. In addition, it provides a tool with which government policies on national minorities can be scrutinized.

In addition to these overarching institutional and legal mechanisms, the international organisations present in numerous countries of South East Europe, such as different agencies of the United Nations and the OSCE, as well as the EU, have played a role in monitoring and protecting the rights of minorities.

#### *b. Recommendations*

The national Helsinki Committees were encouraged to **submit alternative (counter- or shadow-) reports to the official country reports for the Council of Europe advisory committee**. This applies particularly to the countries of the "first round" to join the Framework Convention.

NGOs are invited to **submit reports and other information to the High Commissioner on National Minorities**. Such a flow of information gives Helsinki Committees and other NGOs a means to reach the attention of international organizations.

#### 4 The Case of Montenegro for Minority and Religious Rights

In light of the fact that the seminar on national and religious rights took place in Montenegro, this republic received a high degree of attention. The case of Montenegro illustrates some of the similarities and differences in different Balkan countries.

Like many other countries in the region, the republic is defined as a nation-state in the constitution. Minorities in Montenegro are not clearly defined.

While the relations between majority and minority population have improved considerably in recent years, many issues remain problematic; such as the usage of symbols, media and education. A political climate that allows open and honest discussions between all groups, national and religious, must be created. As in many other countries, large discrepancies between the government programme and the political and social reality can be detected. Whether this difference is caused by the lack of political will on the side of the authorities to address the status of minorities, or whether it is the outcome of a slow transition towards better minority and religious rights, remains a point of contention.

In the educational system minorities are still exposed to stereotyping. In schoolbooks, for example, Islam is characterized as a “religion of warriors,” which affects the Bošnjak/Muslim community in Montenegro.

Minorities remain largely underrepresented in the administration of the republic. While on the ministerial level a number of minority representatives have been included, the bureaucracy still lacks adequate minority representation. Affirmative action is on the political agenda in Montenegro. However, it is difficult to ensure the support of the minority, without actually opening the doors for misuse by non-minority citizens who may take advantage of positive discrimination. A ministry responsible for national minorities has been created; however, it lacks adequate resources and its tasks remain largely undefined.

The self-definition of all minorities is not always clear. The authorities must respect the internal divisions within minorities. This pertains particularly to the minority of Bošnjaks and Muslims.

With regard to religious rights, the relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church is a particularly controversial topic. Following the end of the independent Orthodox Church in Montenegro in 1920, the SOC has dominated Orthodoxy in Montenegro. However, in recent years, there have been attempts to reintroduce the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. This division within the Orthodox Church was met with opposition from the authorities and the Montenegrin Orthodox church remains marginalized and is denied equal access.

Overall, Montenegro is a reflection of the notable improvement of minority rights in a number of countries. This improvement, however, manifests itself mostly through an improved attitude towards minorities in the political mainstream. This rhetoric has only been partly translated into improvements in the legal treatment or the social and economic reality of minority groups.

#### 4. Overall Recommendations

- As many problems regarding both religious rights and national minorities are similar in many countries under discussion here, **networking and co-operation** of Human Rights groups active in the area is imperative in order to learn from the experience of others and find similar approaches to similar problems.
- Human Rights groups should **raise awareness** of the problems pertaining to minorities and religious communities in the media (national and international).
- Training of Human Rights activists is important in order to increase awareness of **international instruments** which might aid the protection of national minorities and religious groups
- Human Rights NGO's must also act as **pressure groups** for their own respective governments and ensure that the issues remain on the political agenda
- As religious and national minorities tend to be marginalised in most societies, activists must aid in **preventing the marginalisation** of such groups.
- **International and national mechanisms** for religious and minority rights need to be interlinked and awareness needs to be heightened.

**ANNEX:****LIST OF PARTICIPANTS****International Organisations and Institutions**

1. Florian Bieber, Central European University
2. Boris Tsilevich, CoE PACE committee
3. Josephine Verspaget, Chair, CoE Specialist Group on Roma and Sinti Issues
4. Gerd Riezland, European Commission Monitoring Mission, Podgorica
5. Eric Dessart, European Commission Monitoring Mission, Podgorica
6. Tatjana Peric, European Roma Rights Centre
7. Alan Phillips, Executive Director, Minority Rights Group
8. Arne Jan Flolo, OSCE ODIHR Office, Montenegro
9. Zdenka Machnyikova, Deputy Legal Adviser, OSCE HCNM
10. Niall Cronin, OSCE Mission, Bosnia
11. Barbara Davis Chief of Mission, UNHCHR FRY
12. David Steele, USAID

**Helsinki Committees**

1. Arben Puto, Albanian Helsinki Committee
2. Mustafa Cero, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina
3. Branko Todorovic, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Republika Srpska
4. Krassimir Kanev, Bulgarian Helsinki Committee
5. Dessi Simeonova, Bulgarian Helsinki Committee
6. Bojan Munjin, Croatian Helsinki Committee
7. Petra Tomaskova, Czech Helsinki Committee
8. Jan ter Laak, Dutch Helsinki Committee
9. Panayote Dimitras, Greek Helsinki Monitor
10. Nafsika Papanikolatos, Greek Helsinki Monitor
11. Andras Kadar, Hungarian Helsinki Committee
12. Mirjana Najcevska, Helsinki Committee, Republic of Macedonia
13. Slobodan Franovic, Montenegrin Helsinki Committee
14. Andrzej Krempleski, Helsinki Committee in Poland
15. Gabriel Andreescu, Romanian Helsinki Committee
16. Sonja Biserko, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
16. Milanka Saponja, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
17. Safeta Bisevac, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
18. Agnes Horvathova, Slovak Helsinki Committee

**Registered participants from Montenegro**

1. Abramovic, Novak (MHC, TV Video Cameraman, Cetinje)
2. Acimic, Radovan (Adventists Church, Podgorica)
3. Agovic, Bajro (Secretary, Moslem Religious Community in Montenegro)
4. Banjevic, Branko (President, Montenegrin Home Association)
5. Bisevac, Safeta (Beograd, Serbian Helsinki Committee)
6. Borilovic, Branislav (MHC, Cetinje)
7. Bubresko, Miodrag (Journalist, Radio of Montenegro)
8. Bujisic, Milanko (Lawyer and HR Activist, Pljevlja)
9. Bulatovic, Nikola (Judge, High Court, Podgorica)
10. Burzan, Danilo (Editor-in-Chief, Montena Fax)

11. Camaj, Kole (Lawyer, MHC, Tuzi – Podgorica)
12. Camaj, Prof. Dr. Marko (Institute of History of Montenegro)
13. Canka, Mustafa (Journalist, Ulcinj)
14. Cetkovic, Tijana (Editor-in-Chief, TV Budva)
15. Crnovrsanin, Sefko (Judge, Constitutional Court, Podgorica)
16. Cunmulaj, Rexhep (Journalist, Radio Mir)
17. Cvijic, Milutin (Priest, Montenegrin Orthodox Church)
18. Demirovic, Reis Idriz (Moslem Religious Community in Montenegro)
19. Dinosh, Ferhat (Member of Parliament, Democratic Union of Albanians in Montenegro)
20. Djuranovic, Drasko (Editor-in-Chief, Monitor)
21. Draga, Nail (Art Club, Ulcinj)
22. Franovic, Slobodan (Lawyer, President of MHC)
23. Gasi, Isen (Roma Association of Montenegro)
24. Hajdinaga, Gzim (Ministry for the Rights of Members of Minorities)
25. Haxhibrahimovic, Maksut (Ulcinj)
26. Ilickovic, Miodrag (Member of Parliament, Social Democratic Party)
27. Janjic, Msgr Ilija (Catholic Church, Bishop of Kotor)
28. Jaukovic, Veljo (Director, TV Sky Sat Montena, Herceg Novi)
29. Jovovic, Ivana (HR Activist, Bar)
30. Kalac, Hidajet (Ministry of Religions, Deputy Minister)
31. Kocan, Esad (Journalist, Monitor, Podgorica)
32. Konjevic, Veselin (Journalist, Montena TV)
33. Koprivica, Veseljko (Forum for Human Rights and Interethnic Relationships)
34. Krivokapic, Ranko (Member of Parliament, SDP, President of the Parliamentary Human Rights Board)
35. Kurpejovic, Avdul (Moslem Home Association in Montenegro)
36. Marcano, Bogdan (MHC, Photographer, Cetinje)
37. Markiqi, Loro (MHC, Member of Presidency, Ulcinj)
38. Marotic, Milorad (Judge, Municipality Court, Niksic)
39. Marovic, Miodrag Malisa (Journalist, HR Activist, Herceg Novi)
40. Martinovic, Bozidar (Judge, Constitutional Court, Podgorica)
41. Marvucic, Vladimir (Lawyer, Ministry of Religions, Deputy Minister)
42. Mihailo, Mitropolit (Metropolitan of Montenegrin Orthodox Church)
43. Milianic, Radovan (Editor-in-Chief, Radio of Montenegro)
44. Milic, Mladen (HR Activist, Pljevlja)
45. Milosevic, Igor (Zid, Podgorica)
46. Mirkovic, Boris (Herceg Novi, Associate, MHC)
47. Nikolic, Ljubica (Association of Independent Syndicates, Podgorica)
48. Novakovic, Ljubisa (Judge, Municipality Court, Podgorica)
49. Pantovic, Jelica (Journalist, Montenegrin TV)
50. Pejovic, Vesna (Journalist, Montenegrin TV, President, Association of Independent Journalists)
51. Pejovic, Vesna (Associate, MHC, Herceg Novi)
52. Perovic, Prof. Dr. Miodrag (Founder of the Monitor and Citizens' Forum of Montenegro)
53. Perovic, Sreten (President, Montenegrin PEN Centre)
54. Perovic, Vesko (Journalist, Onogost, Niksic)
55. Perovic, Vesna (Member of Parliament, Liberal Alliance of Montenegro)
56. Perovic, Xhemal (MHC, Member of Presidency)

57. Petrusic, Budimka (Ministry of Religions)
58. Popovic, Milorad (Independent Writers of Montenegro)
59. Radulovic, Zeljka (Journalist, Pobjeda)
60. Raicevic, Ljiljana (SOS Telephone, Women's Organisation, Podgorica)
61. Rakonjac, Snjezana (Journalist, Radio Free Montenegro)
62. Rastoder, Prof. Dr. Serbo (Faculty of Philosophy, Niksic)
63. Ratkovic, Prof. Dr. Rade (Montenegrin Helsinki Committee, Member of Presidency), Atvija Kerovic
64. Redzic, Nebojsa (Editor-in-Chief, Radio Free Montenegro, Podgorica)
65. Rotkovic, Prof. Dr. Radoslav (Former MO, Herceg Novi)
66. Salaj, Ali (Journalist, Voice of America – Albanian editorial staff, Ulcinj)
67. Samardzic, Novica (Montenegrin Home Association, Podgorica)
68. Saponja, Milanka (Beograd, Serbian Helsinki Committee)
69. Sindik, Nedjeljka (Ministry for the Rights of Members of Minorities)
70. Sljivic, Nada (Lawyer and HR Activist, Pljevlja)
71. Smailovic, Zehra (MHC, Council for Protection of Freedom of Public Information)
72. Spadijer, Marko (Montenegrin Home Association)
73. Tasie, Zivorad (Anima Kotor)
74. Vidovic, Dane (BGD)
75. Vlaovic, Zorica (Editor-in-Chief, TV Sky Sat)
76. Vojcic, Branko (Journalist, Monitor, Podgorica)
77. Vucinic, Stanka (Montenegrin Helsinki Committee, Education Co-ordinator)
78. Vucinic, Stevo (CPC)