GREEK HELSINKI MONITOR
(Greek National Committee of the International Helsinki Federation)

& MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP - GREECE
(Greek Affiliate of Minority Rights Group International)

P.O. Box 51393, GR-14510 Kifisia, Greece Tel. 30-1-620.01.20; Fax: 30-1-807.57.67; E-mail: office@greekhelsinki.gr

5/5/1999

TOPIC: GREEK GOVERNMENT REPORT ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN FR YUGOSLAVIA

Greek Helsinki Monitor and Minority Rights Group-Greece have obtained a copy of the document "Humanitarian Situation in FR Yugoslavia. Report and Proposal of the Government of Greece." The report was prepared following a mid-April visit in Serbia (including Kosovo) of Special Envoy of the Greek Foreign Minister Alex Rondos, who has a solid NGO background. For these reasons, we consider the document of wider interest and reflecting the situation in the field, though written with the necessary diplomatic precautions, as it will be distributed to foreign governments.

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Report and Proposal of the Government of Greece

[Prepared following the visit of the Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs of the Foreign Minister of Greece]

1. Introduction

The visit to the FRY occurred between April 15-22. Meetings were held with officials of both the Federal Government and the government of the Republic of Serbia. The main purpose of the visit was to obtain a general perspective of the humanitarian situation in the FRY and particularly with regard to the situation in Kosovo.

The government of Greece was encouraged to provide as such assistance as it could. Delivery of assistance into Kosovo by Greece was also welcomed.

2. Serbia

Damage and Impact: The situation in Serbia is rapidly deteriorating. The bombings have severely damaged a wide variety of economic facilities and economic infrastructure. Jobs have been lost; small businesses which had become part of the survival mechanism for many Yugoslavs during sanctions are not operating; the health and social welfare provision network is being undermined by diminishing medical supplies and the disruption of normal transport routes. These immediate effects of the bombing compound the difficulties previously experienced by vulnerable groups in Serbia during the long period of sanctions. Specific incidents have occurred with the bombing that cause localized emergencies: destruction of factories and attendant ecological damage; interruption of water supplies to some urban centers; damage to social service centers.

The long-term effects of the bombing are currently incalculable. Serbia is being economically amputated limp by limb: Belgrade is now cut off from Vojvodina; access to Montenegro is extremely difficult; major factories, oil refineries and other strategically vital economic assets are being systematically destroyed. Only the electrical grid remains intact, for the present. General work of government continues though disrupted by the continued shifting of government offices.

Special mention should be made of the situation regarding civic life: with the bombing many civic groups active in human rights, representation of communities such as refugees and in service provision have closed their doors for want of finance and out of fear. These people who represent civic life and action are being asphyxiated under these circumstances. While they do not necessarily represent a democratic alternative, they represent the infrastructure of open civic life for the future. Their disappearance is an agonizing problem for those who see such issues as essential to the issues of justice and humanitarianism.

The vulnerable population currently include: (a) the elderly who were dependent of very small pensions and who now have little access to the market or to assistance, (b) Serb refugees from Bosnia, Krajina and now Kosovo who were largely dependent on assistance in the past and for whom the bombing is something both terrifying and incomprehensible: for these there should be special attention given in the years to come. While society strives to retain a semblance of normality under what are, officially, conditions of war, the effects will have an increasing corrosive effect on children the longer the bombing lasts. This, despite a prodigious propaganda effort to shore up morale in the country.

Management of Humanitarian programs is officially under the authority of the Federal Ministry of Health. Items brought to FRY are meant to be handed over at a number of selected frontier posts for onward over at a number of selected frontier posts for onward distribution by the authorities. Much of this is being done by the Yugoslav Red Cross. Currently, the only official exception to this system is the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Government of Greece has been able to negotiate independent operations. With one exception (to International orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC) which has continued operations at a significantly more modest level since the bombing began. ` Priority Needs: There are four categories: (a) medical supplies for the official health care system (b) supplementary food and hygiene supplies for traditionally vulnerable groups, notably the previous refugee caseload (c) psycho-social support for those currently traumatized and (d) discrete support to NGOs which have been providing some degree of independent service to communities.

The absence of fuel will undoubtedly restrict most humanitarian initiatives in Serbia.

3. Montenegro:

This mission did not visit Montenegro and is not qualified to comment on the situation there. From a distance one can offer the following observations, however : (a) the influx of refugees from Kosovo has added to the already swollen ranks of displaced Albanians in Montenegro (b) this has stretched the already limited capacity of that Republic to handle social issues; (c) relations with Serbia are not easy and the related tension adds to the difficulties there; (d) some international NGOs have remained; (e) there are humanitarian supplies still stocked at the port of Bar which need to be appropriately distributed provided there are adequate logistical support and supplies.

4. Kosovo

Two days were spent in Kosovo. These involved discussions with officials in Pristina, a visit to the Pristina hospital; site visits to Podujevo obstina, site visits on the raid to and from Prizren.

General impressions are the following:

**empty streets in the main urban centers (many staying inside out of fear)

**numerous but not all villages empty, with ground lying fallow, animals roaming untended, houses selectively destroyed through ground operations. It is as if history stopped in an instant: damage is not comprehensive (which is some consolation from the point of view of reconstruction).

** physical destruction from bombing is closely linked to military targets and does not appear to have followed the more strategic economic targeting in Serbia. Roads and bridges were generally passable.

Quantified data on population, their location and movement is currently impossible. There are some trends that must be noted for operational purposes:

a. Albanians and Serbs have fled Serbs to relative north of Kosovo, Albanians to the neighbouring countries and into the mountains within Kosovo.

b. Based on previous estimates of the Kosovo population and current figures of refugees, there are some 800,000 people left in Kosovo. Of these at least half, if not more are in the mountains;

c. C. The frontier is fairly well controlled and the FRY authorities open and close the tap at will.

d. There is evidence of people returning from the mountains [This mission saw some 20,000 Albanians returning towards Podujevo obstina on April 21/22].

e. This trend can be explained in the following manner: FRY military/police units, staying just ahead of bombing, are able to attack now weakened KLA units, driving them away and leaving the civilians exposed. These civilians are then informed by the local authorities that they may return with impunity. This mission was informed that the same would be done at the FYROM frontier and in the area between Pec and Decani.

The conditions of those returning from the mountains are poor but not catastrophic: they will become as the weeks progress and if they do not have access to food, clean water and medical supplies. Those returning to Podujevo were suffering from exposure; they were extremely dirty (unwashed, same old clothes, lice etc.), fear of infection s as the climate warms. One can only presume that the longer they stay in the mountains the deterioration of their physical conditions will deteriorate rapidly. Brief interviews indicated that they descend from the mountains in search of food, medicine and now security.

Access in Kosovo defined in the following way:

a. Most main roads are secure.

b. Some side roads are not secure because of continued operations (it is claimed) against KLA [One can also presume it might be operations to empty out some locations of their local population].

c. The mountain areas, where many displaced are located, are currently inaccessible.

Institutional authority and obstacles: The Kosovo Executive Council is nominally in charge and has extended its good offices for cooperation. The security officials have the final say (they were well aware of this mission and proved cooperative). Local community institutions do not exist (the Mother Teresa Society is no longer operational, though some of its volunteers may be found in the mountains and among surviving communities). The Yugoslav Red Cross is operational, claims authority for distribution but has, in the past, suffered from a poor reputation in the eyes of the Albanian community: work with them may hamper confidence building.

Programming of issues: It is necessary to establish very tight communications: local authorities must be closely informed of intended targeting; NATO must be informed on truck movements; Belgrade and Kosovo authorities must be informed of convoy timing and destinations.

Programming needs: Immediate assistance (building on the current Greek pipeline into Pristina from Skopje), must include:

a. Family food parcels, individuals or family hygiene parcels. These are for direct distribution to families in need throughout the region, with special attention to those locations where there are displaced returning.

b. Specialized medical supplies for hospitals and health centers to address severe cases of sickness and wounds from shrapnel.

c. Medical authorities should indicate what type of vaccination campaign can be carried out.

Programming proposal for Kosovo:

This program must be guided by speed, flexibility, sound back up for security (NATO and on the ground) and careful supervision of targeting and distribution.

a. Propositioning of stocks in Skopje (or Sofia and Thessaloniki).

b. Contracting of at least 50 10-ton trucks to maintain regular flow.

c. Caseload of up to 400,000 individuals is the target.

d. Primary Kosovo warehousing in Pristina

e. E. Onward distribution to locations throughout Kosovo based upon (1) local knowledge of displaced return (2) due notification to NATO of truck movements (3) placement of Greek staff in secondary distribution sites.

f. Establishment of office in Pristina to manage programming.