POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE STEREOTYPES IN THE GREEK PRESS ON INTERNAL MINORITIES AND NEIGHBORING PEOPLES: OCTOBER 1996 - MARCH 1997

This is the Greek contribution to the Project “Balkan Neighbors” involving teams which monitor the main print media in seven Balkan countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Turkey. The Project, coordinated by ACCESS, a Sofia-based NGO, started in October 1996 and is funded by the Open Society Institute, Budapest. Greek Helsinki Monitor is responsible for the project in Greece. Also, on the basis of the monthly national reports, Mariana Lenkova of the Greek Helsinki Monitor is responsible for the preparation of regional summaries distributed separately. The semester national summaries are published in the newsletter “Balkan Neighbours” produced by ACCESS.

Panayote Elias Dimitras (with contributions by Maria Fola, Lola Kalandrakis, Nafsika Papanikolatou, Christina Rouggeri, Vasilis Sakellariou, and Persa Zeri)

ABSTRACT

Greek media continued to show their hostility to any reference to the existence, let alone problems, of a Macedonian or a Turkish minority. Likewise, they kept feeding the prevailing Albanophobia, with some noteworthy self-criticism though. Moreover, the crisis in Albania led to many comments on her people’s poverty, an image the press also gave for the peoples of the much less covered countries of Bulgaria and Romania. At the same time, that crisis, along with those in other Balkan countries, led to a number of pejorative comments for the Albanians if not for the whole region.

On the other hand, the Greek media have been changing their attitude towards Macedonia, Serbia and, to some extent, Turkey. The coverage of Macedonia decreased substantially and became much less negative. In Serbia, the domestic challenge to Milosevic’ authority was reflected in an about-turn of the Greek media which became critical of him, though in many cases the opposition too was treated with suspicion. Finally, the Greek Foreign Minister’s positive comments on Turkey stirred a debate that confounded the traditional visceral treatment of that country.

We present here the analysis and reconstruction of the images formed by eight Greek newspapers of all political tendencies on Balkan neighbors and on religious, ethnic and linguistic minorities in Greece. After the end of the cold war era, nationalist passions have risen, enhanced by the church, the educational institutions, the political world and the mass media. They helped develop feelings of Greek superiority, of national affront, and of threats from foreigners, minorities of all kinds, illegal immigrants and refugees coming to Greece in recent years. The lack of an established scholarly tradition in treating the complicated historical, economic, political and social issues is reflected in the lack of knowledge which characterizes most journalists. Moreover, there is a common editorial line of all newspapers, when dealing with sensitive ‘national’ issues.

Media Monitored

The publications monitored are five daily newspapers published seven days a week: Apogevmatini, Adesmeftos Typos, Eleftheros Typos -all rightwing and quite nationalist; Ethnos (center-left and rather nationalist) and Eleftherotypia (center-left with occasional nationalist overtones); one morning paper, Kathimerini (center-right and mildly nationalist), not published on Mondays; one evening paper Ta Nea(centrist and mildly nationalist) which is not published on Sundays; and To Vima (centrist and mildly nationalist), the Sunday newspaper which is published by the publisher of Ta Nea. They are the newspapers with the largest circulation at national level and cover all major political orientations and trends.

Internal Minorities Monitored

The minority groups in Greece monitored are the following national, ethnolinguistic, religious, social and immigrant minority communities: Macedonians (as well as Slavomacedonians), Turks, Roma (Gypsies), Pomaks, Vlachs, Arvanites, Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, New Religious Movements and Immigrants. The composition of the minority population is Roma 3.3 %, Arvanites 2%, Macedonians 2% Vlachs 2%, Turks 0.5% and Pomaks 0.3%. (Mostly illegal) Immigrants make up some 5%-6%. The religious minorities make up 1% (The members of minority groups -ethnic and religious- and the immigrants all face various forms of discrimination).

Internal Minorities

This common attitude was repeatedly expressed when media reported on foreign documents that mentioned Greece for her non-recognition of the Macedonian minority and the denial to her Muslims to identify themselves as Turks: almost always, the authors of these reports were the subject of often offensive comments and their motives were declared suspect. First came the report Unfinished Peace written by the “International Commission on the Balkans” created mainly by the American Carnegie Foundation and Aspen Institute (Berlin). The report was called by the Greek government as “of bad faith” (K., Eth., Ap. 7/11) while its spokesperson D. Reppas expressed disagreement and “serious objection to its content (…) as such reports, in the end, undermine rather than facilitate the communication and the understanding among the peoples of the region and the cooperation among those peoples” (K. 7/11). The report was treated negatively by the entire Greek press and was characterized as “suspicious” (Ap. 6/11), “anti-Hellenic” (Ap., Eth. 5/11), and “a boiling proposition on minorities” (E.T. 5/11). “The ‘minority’ issues give a suitable excuse to the planners of the ‘new order’ for their intention to ‘deal with’ the Balkans like a ‘banal’ region in pain, which should not be considered a typical European one” (K. 8/11). The fact that the press conference for the presentation of the book took place in the offices of the European Commission and was chaired by Commissioner van der Brook led to its presentation in the press as “Brussels Scandal” (Eth. 6/11): “the Commission ‘adopts’ the anti-Hellenic report” (Eth. 5/11). Van der Brook was called “an agent provocateur” (N. 6/11) and “a mouthpiece of the Turks” (Ad.T. 6/11) because he “tried to put under the auspices of the European Union a provocatory report -of American interests- which mentions the existence of ‘Turkish and Macedonian’ minorities in Greece, adding that the rights of these two minorities are not recognized by Greek authorities” (N. 6/11).

Then came the turn of the annual report of the American organization Human Rights Watch mentioning inter alia Greece. “Wild attack against Greece by an American organization. Dirty story. They baptized Skopje as Macedonia” (Ad.T. 7/12). “They forget Attila [reference to the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974], speak about ‘Turks’ and ‘Macedonians’” (Eth. 6/12). “Greece the target again” (N. 6/12). “We repress -they claim- Turks, Albanians, Slavomacedonians” (El. 6/12).

Third in line was the annual US State Department report on human rights. Particularly disturbing appeared to be the reference to the Macedonian minority. “Alleged minority and alleged discrimination” (Eth. 31/1) are “discovered by the report” (N. 31/1) using “strange wording for the bilinguals of Western Macedonia” (Ad.T. 31/1). “Specifically as regards the ‘pseudo-Macedonians’ the State Department mentions that the Greek authorities forbid the Slav-speaking population to call themselves a minority and name themselves ‘Macedonian’” (E.T. 31/1). It is a noteworthy contradiction the way the Greek press treats the same report when it refers to other countries: then it is considered authoritative, just like it treated the previous Human Rights Watch report. For example, on Turkey: “They see increasing human rights violations in Turkey” (El. 31/1): “a report-slap in the face of Turkey from the US (finally) on Turks’ barbarisms (…) Addicted beasts” (Ad.T. 31/1); “Slap in the face of Ankara from the State Department” (E.T. 31/1).

The prevailing hostility towards the Turkish minority was eloquently expressed in an interview (Ad.T. 16/2) with former Assistant Foreign Minister Virginia Tsouderou (ND). “The Turkish Consulate in Komotini buys off people and consciences”; she attributes the recent incidents resulting from construction works in the Kimmeria mosque to a falsification of a document of the building inspection authority by an employee who was “bribed” by Turkey’s agents. “Between 1990-1995, Muslims bought some 1,300 acres in Thrace, a fact that gives rise to suspicions that the money comes from Turkey rather than from the uncle in America (…) When I was in the ministry, tens of agents tried to enter Thrace under the cover of mufti.” The journalist’s strengthened the views of the Greek politician, making the article even more prone to boost the xenophobic impressions it may have left the reader. The title was “We’ve become a country that gets humiliating slaps in the face” and the lead includes the following unsubstantiated allegations. “Orgy of terror by Turkish Consulate men in Thrace. Erbakan’s agents, totally insolent, ‘throw to the lions’ whoever does not satisfy Ankara’s appetite. Their target are the Greek Muslims in Komotini and Xanthi who want to cut the ‘umbilical cord’ with Turkey. (…) They are beating relentlessly, destroying properties, blackmailing, bribing and exerting tremendous pressure on whoever resists them. (…) The MIT [the Turkish Intelligence Service] has infiltrated even our civil service! They paid handsomely and filled the pockets of Greek employees in order to forge official documents. (…) They put up re-transmitters so that we hear them all day insulting us.”

When there was talk about possible repatriation of Macedonian political refugees, PASOK deputy Stelios Papathemelis stated that “should that information prove accurate, should there indeed be such thoughts among those in charge and the state agencies, then it is indeed an act of high … senility” and added, addressing the Foreign Minister Th. Pangalos, that “Greece will be the only country in the world that will import … a minority.” (Ad.T. 18/11; Eth. 19/11). To him, these people who live in the Republic of Macedonia are “janissaries of Greek origin who have undergone an internal and mental ethnological mutation” -meaning that from Greeks that they were, according to him, when they left Greece, they have now become Macedonians- “and having rejected the Greek conscience turn against their previous fatherland creating themselves the problems”. Many articles were in the spirit of Mr. Papathemelis’ statements: “They open the borders to the agents!, (…) to enraged Greek-haters and hirelings of neighboring countries which covet Greek territories” (Ad.T. 30/11) and “they are turning anti-Greeks into Greeks” (Ad.T. 28/11).

Among the rare exceptions, noteworthy, because reflecting the situation, was the column by Sifis Polimilis in El. (26/11): “Social and political racism does not concern only some citizens. (…) Combined with the appropriate dose of ethnopatriotism, it really blossoms among our political leaders (…) as the pure-blood Greeks with a certificate of purity of their genes (…) shape up consciences and affect broader social strata that have been accustomed to scare-mongering and demonisation”; he mentions cases of “ethnic racism” emanating from two politicians: the “Christian-socialist original ethnopatriot” Papathemelis but also the “nationally-correctly minded (ethnikofronas) racist” Karatzaferis on the Rozakis case.

The latter concerned then Assistant Foreign Secretary Christos Rozakis, who was reported to have a double family name Rozenstein-Rozakis: the theoretical Jewish origin of the first part led to an effusion of anti-Semitism, that was initiated by the extreme right newspaper ‘Stohos’ and went over to the mainstream press and the Parliament. “The mysterious professor Rozakis (…) seems to have not just a double quality (as he is also Assistant Foreign Minister) but also a double name (…). What is really going on? And why the professor hastens to explain himself disclaiming his origin and his religion? Has anyone told him that Jews are met with prejudice in Greece? Or is this what he says to foreigners?” (E.T. 6/11). The answer to whether Jews are treated with prejudice in Greece will come a few days later with an unprecedented parliamentary question tabled by [opposition conservative] ND [New Democracy] deputy G. Karatzaferis. “Explanations [asked] for Rozakis’ past” (E.T. 13/11) and “Insinuations about Rozakis” (Ad.T. 13/11). Mr. Karatzaferis asks the Prime Minister whether “Mr. Ch. Rozakis, your Assistant Foreign Minister, and Mr. Rozenstein-Rozakis Christos is one and the same person?” “If so, has Mr. Rozenstein’s past being investigated as well as his possible connections and commitments to other countries?” (E.T., Ad.T., Ap., 13/11) [insinuating that Jews have such connections]. Indicative was “the lack of reaction from the Official Opposition [ND] but also the Greek Parliament [which] certainly puzzles the members of our community” as stated by the President of the Central Jewish Council Nasim Mais (El. 25/11).

Albania and Albanians

Until the rebellion in early 1997, the image of the Albanian was being shaped by the extensive Albanophobia in the Greek media. The negative stereotype was confirmed by research results published in K. (16/2): “in the conscience of most Greeks the image of the immigrant is identified with that of the Albanian and has as a consequence the stereotype ‘Albanian, illegal immigrant, violent, thief, dangerous, criminal’; (…) the use of violence against Albanians and, more generally, against other immigrants is no longer a moral demerit. In the conscience of many people it is been preceded by the image of these immigrants as inferior and potentially dangerous. A migrant has henceforth the image of a human being unworthy of respect and protection.”

Abundant hate speech was fueling such stereotypes, often in titles. “Albanians, a scourge in the whole Western Macedonia and Epirus” (Ap. 5/10) “Illegal immigrants, the bleeding wound” (N. 3/10; E.T. 6/10); “The ‘godfathers’ have divided Attica in 4” (…) “The Albanian Mafia promotes and controls infant prostitution in the center of Athens and offers protection to night clubs” (Ap. 7/10). “Albanian Mafiosi spread fear in Corfu” (E.T. 12/10); “Blockade of Albanian hashish in the borders” (…) “Terrorism by illegal immigrants” (E.T. 16/10); “Huge progress of the Albanian Mafia” (N. 26/10); “Albanian Mafia opens the way to white death” (Ap. 7/10); “Albanian with a villa in Ekali” (…) “The leader of the Albanian Mafia in Greece has bought himself a mansion” (Ap. 21/10); “Albanians sold hashish to a policeman” (Ap. 13/11); “Gang of Albanians” (Ap. 12/11); “Gates of Albanian drugs (…) as traffic of Albanian hashish is carried out through Epirus” (Ad.T. 13/11); “Albanians sell drugs to our children” (E.T. 29/11); “Who will save us and our property from the plague of Albanian illegal immigrants?” (letter to the editor Ap. 27/11); “Hooded Albanian killed fellow countryman” (Ap. 5/12); “A network of Albanian Mafia in Greece, Italy, and Germany” (N. 11/12); “Albanian cut-throats ruined the life of a 55-year old worker” (Ad.T. 8/1). “They are the imported nightmare of our country. Compared with them even the toughest Greek criminals look like sheep” (Ap. 8/1).

This negative stereotype was reinforced by the case of a gang of criminals who, at the turn of the year, invaded homes, muzzled their owners and robbed them. Though there was no evidence about the identity of the criminals, but mere suspicions that they were foreigners, almost all Greek papers referred to them as Albanians. “Albanian terror” (Ad.T., 11/12). The role of the electronic media in this case too was decisive and was condemned by many. Such a climate of hysteria was created that it reached the point “to arm the hands of Greek citizens who considered the need to protect their lives and their property as a fundamental right of theirs” (E.T. 7/1) and were threatening they will shoot any Albanian they deemed suspect. There were many comments which contributed to the general climate, like the following: “Let them call us racist. We are tired caressing all scums that came here uninvited, so as not to lose the reputation of hospitable Greeks. I am seriously considering in fact to move to Albania, as it will be quieter there since all the outlaws are here” (Ad.T. 12/1).

There was though also a lot of media self-criticism. “What is the cause of Albanophobia?” (…) “The rise of criminality is attributed to illegal immigrants. So, we have passed from sympathy to attacks against economic refugees by men wearing stockings on their heads. According to a survey, 43% of Greeks say no to granting equal rights to immigrants, while in the aversion scale Turks come first, followed by Albanians, Muslims of Thrace, and Jews” (El. 4/10); “Racism hits our civilization” (…) “Organized groups attack illegal immigrants’ houses located in an Athens ‘ghetto’” (the paper also mentions 41 incidents near the border with Albanian immigrants as victims, K. 6/10); “Fears against immigrants unwarranted (Eth. 1/10); “Not all Albanians are alike, we should not as a society lead ourselves to the extremes and to a witch hunt” (M. Dimitriou, E.T. 7/1). “If all the things done by a gang of Albanians -as we are told- were done by a gang of Greeks, no one would have armed himself” (Ad.T. 8/1). “As part of our recent racism, Albanians are to be blamed for everything.” (E.T. 9/1).

Once the “pyramid” crisis erupted, Greek media turned their attention to that country and her people, painting images of poverty, wretchedness, desperation and social unrest. Albanians “are desperate, cheated, and indignant depositors” (El. 17/2), “the Balkans’ miserable ones (…) who don’t have even bread to eat” (E.T. 17/2), “the wretched ones who try to come to our country to escape poverty and misery” (Eth. 16/2), “the disappointed ones” (Ad.T. 17/2), and “the angry ones who took it to the streets” (Ap. 8/2). As reactions continued to culminate, the crisis in Albania became front page story presented as a mass, yet unorganized, rebellion, while very often, there was talk of armed gangs, which contributed to chaos and anarchy. “Rage became a revolution in Albania and the situation is no longer under control. The enraged people in despair took arms in order to take revenge for the lost dreams of half a century, now that the collapse of the pyramidal banking institutions has shattered the last hope for a better life.” (Ad.T. 3/3); “Avlona [Vlore] gave the impression of a town in a state of anarchy, delivered at the mercy of its furious inhabitants (...) enraged protesters go around in the main streets shouting and firing in the air...” (V. 2/3).

Three main points were mostly emphasized in press accounts:

The potential danger for the Greek minority and fears “about a provocation against the Greek element in Northern Epirus” (Ad.T. 3/3); “Special concern is provoked by information that Turkish gangs from Bosnia create a chaotic situation, liberating convicts and plundering army warehouses. Fears are expressed about an organized ‘pogrom’ against Greeks, with the accusation that Athens supported Berisha’s regime” (Ad.T. 3/3).

Fear about a massive flow of immigrants from Albania, reaching to the extent of creating a climate of Albanophobia. “...10,000 or even more illegal immigrants are expected to be ‘exported’, among them convicts and criminals, something that will have obvious consequences on the Greek citizens” (Ap. 4/3); “...our borders are threatened by the flow of thousands of desperate people, among them also convicts who want to move their activity to our country...” (Ap. 4/3).

Fears about “an extended destabilization of the Balkans” (Ad.T. 3/3).

Some journalists and politicians even expressed opinions and positions which indirectly supported the idea of an intervention in Northern Epirus, in order to save the Greek minority, while others, more directly, argued that it was a unique opportunity for Greece to take over Northern Epirus. “Ten hours suffice today in order to solve a problem lasting for half a century. (...) Northern Epirus (or Southern Albania as those in PASOK who have capitulated have been convinced to call it) would become Greek again. And our 300,000 brothers would breathe freely.” (E.T. 5/3).

The crisis in Albania also led to some anti-Albanian and even general anti-Balkan remarks. “This is not a state but a nearby curse of the Pharaoh. A vegetable garden, which we have allowed to grow for over half a century, and which is hence creating for us inadmissible problems. They have devastated us, offended us, cheated on us...” (Ad.T. 12/3). Many times the rebellion in Albania is explained as a consequence of the Albanian people’s barbarism and lack of culture, which led them to corresponding forms of action. “Albanians living in the cities are more dangerous when discussing. In these regions they shoot more easily than they discuss. An Albanian prefers to shoot before stating his opinion” (from a 1930 Frankfurter Zeitung article quoted in K. 8/3). “A disorganized society without any rules, a people lacking intellect, without ideals, food and money, who are seeking revenge for the years which have been stolen from them by ‘the tyrants of Tirana’. But reality is one: that an uncultivated people is armed, that they collect their indispensable and descends for the promised land, the Cannan of the Balkans, Greece...” (Ad.T. 16/3). The Albanians are presented as “a people who don’t have a sense of collective life and don’t conform easily with the rules of a community” (E.T. 15/3). Lastly, in light of the general crisis in the Balkans and “the glass that is filled to the brim because of Albania”, we read the following comment: “Greece has collected excrements like a bitch that moves her tail! Yugoslavia disintegrates, Greece pays the price; Bulgaria goes bankrupt, again Greece groans; Romania gets impoverished, thieves multiply in Greece; Albania burns, Greece is the first victim of the fumes” (Ad.T. 16/3).

Bulgaria and Bulgarians

Greek media focused on the difficult economic situation of the country. Hyperinflation, continuous devaluation the lev, timidity of the governments of recent years to take measures to improve the economic situation and create a more favorable investment climate were the main themes of that coverage. The image of Bulgarians, miserable people deprived of essential foodstuff, and searching even in dustbins, was the dominant one, along with the presence of extensive organized crime rings.

First, though, the murder of Loukanov led to ample comments about Bulgarian Mafia. “Mafia killed Loukanov” (E.T. 6/10); “Mafia and political chaos strangle the neighboring country. Murder of Loukanov” (Ad.T. 3/10). “In the neighboring country the Mafia is together with political power and the ‘companies’ like Multi-Group the third side of the triangle of the new economic - social regime that took the place of ‘real socialism’. The old state fortune as well as any product of this country is redistributed through the influence of these ‘companies’ and their close relation to organized crime, which makes the bond of this new, redistributing pyramid” (V. 6/10).

Most references were to the extreme poverty of the people. “More hunger and poverty for Bulgarians” (N. 30/11), with references to the ragmen who dig in the trash of the garbage dumps of Sofia “with agility to avoid the bulldozers”. “Garbage disappears before it reaches the dump. At night, the dustbins in the good neighborhoods of Sofia are ‘plundered’ by hungry ragged men”. In the same line, “infants die from hunger” one can read in a title (Ap. 28/11). “Below poverty level half the Bulgarian people” (El. 13/1); “They eat from the food of the dogs” (Ad.T. and K, 20/2); “In Bulgaria they lack even bread” (K. 21/1); “Bulgaria on the verge of misery” (El. 19/2); “Living conditions of the Bulgarian people are, as it is known, miserable, with poverty ravaging the greatest part of the population, especially in the large urban centers. There are queues even for some of the essential goods of immediate need. Bulgaria is characterized today as the poorest country of Europe.” (E.T. 16/3) “People have not just reached the limits of extreme destitution, but they have gone well beyond them. The sight of people searching with anxiety into the garbage isn’t rare any more. (...) You must have read that a week ago a list was imposed on the sale of bread! In a European country! Unprecedented and unheard of!” (El. 22/3).

Macedonia and Macedonians

The virulent anti-Macedonianism of the Greek press has quieted down to the extent that the nationalists speak of oblivion and complaisance. The chairman of the Pan-Macedonian Union of Europe P. Papachristopoulos said that “in Greece there is a situation of oblivion maybe because the irredentist propaganda is not felt.” (Ad.T. 18/11). Likewise, Mr. Papathemelis stated that “the Skopje issue is not lost but neglected” (Ap. 14/11) and that “micro-Helladism leads to complaisance” (N. 14/11). Even former Defense and now Education Minister G. Arsenis said that “complaisance leads to a national tragedy; that’s why we need a national awakening and a solid internal front in the country” (N. 14/11). So, there were again articles accusing the Greek government because “it stays silent to Gligorov’s gross propaganda which distorts a history of millennia” (Ap. 28/12).

Nevertheless, the matter of the name remained a taboo for the Greek press. “In the encyclopedia ‘Nea Domi’ the entry ‘Skopje’ doesn’t exist! The authors have adopted the Slavs’ position. The reader is referred to the entry Macedonia” (…) I wonder, what will our children learn in the end? That there exist two Macedonias or that Greece is trying to falsify History?” (Ad.T. 12/1). In (El. 11/1) there was a comment concerning the attitude of the British ambassador in Skopje, Tony Milson: “Not only did he use a fluent ‘Macedonian’ language but he even competed with the Skopjans themselves in his references to ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedonians’.”

The protest demonstrations of Macedonian students against instruction in Albanian at the Pedagogical Academy of Skopje University were covered in mostly ‘neutral’ way, sometimes linking the issue with the situation in Kosovo, and the crises in Albania and Serbia, expressing the fear that Berisha and Milosevic would exploit the situation for internal political reasons. The image of a situation out of control and full of dangers in the Balkans was frequent. “The thermometer of nationalism in the Balkans is on the rise” (El. 25/2), “Skopjan students on strike” (Eth. 18/2), “Anti-Albanian demonstration of students” (El. 18/2), “War of demonstrations in Skopje” (El. 26/2).

There were still some deprecatory comments. “The Pope did not fall in the Skopjans’ trap and did not bless the newly-made ‘Macedonian’ forgers of history. (…) Well, how could it be otherwise. The liars, the thieves, and … the forgers of history can rejoice only in the first year!” (Ad.T. 28/12); “This tiny state”, which we shouldn’t “take seriously, nor should we consider it equal to other states, wishing to be part of the EU and other international organizations” (Ad.T. 12/3); “the artificial state at our northern borders, which attempts to destabilize Greece, Bulgaria and Albania with an ‘ethnic Macedonian minority’” (E.T. 16/3).

Romania and Romanians

Romania is understandably the least covered country of the Balkans by the Greek media. The elections gave an opportunity for some positive references. “Triumph of the conservatives in Romania and Serbia” (…) “the conservative turn in Romania was completed’ (Ap. 19/11). The result was considered as the completion of a course that started in 1989. So, with a title “‘Turning of the page’ in Romania’s politics” Ad.T. wrote (19/11): “Seven years after the bloody rebellion which overthrew Nicolae Ceausescu, Romania lives her own ‘velvet revolution’”, noting that it was “the first democratic alternation in power in the history of the country.” And K. (19/11) added that “Bucarest newspapers characterized the electoral victory of Costantinescu ‘a logical evolution’ of a revolution, which started seven years ago and whose aims stayed for long unfulfilled”. Finally, El (29/11) spoke of the revival of “Greek-Romanian friendship that historically bonds the two peoples”, on the occasion of the fraternization of a Greek with a Romanian school.

Otherwise, an image of crisis in the economic and social spheres was presented with mentions of the poverty that plagued the country. Many articles mentioned the problems that the economy of the country was facing, mainly attributed to the delay of the program of privatizations announced by the government, and to the elections that took place which “froze” the necessary reforms. “Romania: 130 homeless people froze to death” (E.T. 8/1).“A thousand babies were abandoned in Romania’s clinics” (Ap. 10/12). “They abandoned 100,000 children in Romania” (El. 11/2), “They abandon babies in Romania” (Ap. 11/2), “Unemployment in Romania” (K. 7/2).

Finally, in crime-related stories Romanians were often mentioned. “A Romanian has ravaged the Northern suburbs.” (E.T. 27/12); “Cold-blooded murderers the three Romanians” (Ap. 18/1). When the story of the robberies in the north-east suburbs of Athens was first covered, some of the newspapers that had not “baptized” the robbers Albanians talked about the possibility of them to be Romanians, the “number two” in the list of (foreign) usual suspects.

Serbia and the Serbs

The municipal elections in Serbia and the ensuing demonstrations against the so popular in Greece Milosevic made the Greek media more circumspect towards Greece’s “traditional friend and ally”. Before the elections, one could still read praises of the Serbian President, expected to win: “Milosevic certain for a victory” (N. 4/11); “The one and only” (…) “So Serbs found themselves punished by the international community, while the man who at the time was criticized by all international media (how much does it matter any more if the latter were right or wrong) as the person responsible for the Yugoslav tragedy is vindicated again as the only one capable of leading the country also after the crisis” (N. 2/11). When demonstrations started, though, the climate changed. With small-letter titles at the beginning “The opposition accuses Milosevic for political fraud” (Eth. 26/11) and “Demonstration in Belgrade” (Ad.T. 26/11) but also big headlines and dossiers elsewhere: “Milosevic lost Belgrade” (E.T. 19/11); “They react to Milosevic’ arbitrariness with hunger strike.” (El. 21/11); “Popular rebellion is pending” (K. 28/11); “The revolution of the eggs” (K. 30/11).

The spectacular about-turn of the vast majority of the Greek media towards Milosevic was aptly summarized by one of the rare ‘dissenting’ voices of the past. “Let’s go back to Slobodan Milosevic. Let’s recall how the Greek mass media presented him during all these last few years. Let’s remember the eulogies, the daily praises and the positive characterizations. ‘Ingenious politician!’ ‘Man of vision!’ ‘Daring leader!’ But, (…) mainly since November, we can notice a considerable change in the attitude of the Greek press towards S. Milosevic. He is now ‘dangerous,’ ‘he is leading the country to disaster,’ ‘his regime is personal and corrupted” (T. Papadopoulou, El. 9/1).

Indeed, from December 1996 on, there were detailed reports of the negotiations, the political developments, the profile of the opposition “which, scattered until now, is rallying, with the blessings of the Orthodox Church, against Milosevic” (El. 1/12). The press presented in general the image of a people who massively tried to restore democracy in their country. With the title “Serbian Polytechnic” (N. 10/12) there was a description of the struggle and the demands of the students of the University of Belgrade “the new generation that has grown up in the deprivations, the manipulation and the humiliation of the last decade” (El. 10/12). In such a climate, started appearing in the Greek press articles mentioning Milosevic as “the father of Serbian irredentism, who tries to create a country that will suit him, his wife, his son, his daughter and their company” (N. 21/12). In an analysis, academic Lena Divani (N. 18/12) wrote that “Milosevic had succeeded in rallying the large majority of the Serbian nation around the line of a nationalist struggle that transcended classes, put brother against brother, and was extremist (…). But not for quite long. Time had taken its revenge again, washing ashore on the corpse of Yugoslavia all the same economic and political problems of the early 1980s. (…) Huge waves of demonstrators who demand again bread and freedom.” We got the picture of a situation, beyond control, sometimes extremely dangerous, as there was always Kosovo. President Milosevic was now alone, completely marginalized, having lost his last supports, among them that of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which in the past had kept a “praising” attitude towards the regime “reaching the point of the extreme, religious fanaticism (…) avoiding to condemn the crimes in Herzegovina” (L. Hadjiprodromidis, El. 3/1). The attitude of the armed forces, Montenegro (“Montenegro warns Milosevic”, E.T. 8/1), the West (O.S.C.E.’s report in favor of the opposition) and of the Greek government, with the clear backing by Foreign Minister Pangalos of the opposition’s demands after his talks with Milosevic (“Milosevic lost Greece”, Eth. 14/1) was widely presented, in every occasion. Milosevic was no longer reliable, was retreating only in order to save time, even causing incidents in the Kosovo area, hoping to attract the attention away from him, claiming there was a danger of civil war, aiming only at one thing: control of power. “Let’s see how the ruler of Serbia will be forced to give up the only thing in which he has always been interested and which is power, keeping it and managing it at any price provided that this price was paid by anyone but him.” (El. 9/1).

This negative turn notwithstanding, there was a Milosevic interview in the country’s largest circulation newspaper Vima (9/2) which gave an image of him contrary to the one that almost all Greek papers had been presenting since the beginning of the demonstrations. Therein the Serbian leader emerged through his answers as a man who never sought power, who was compelled to implicate his country in “a blood bath caused by foreign interests” and who tried to help democracy take roots in his country. Moreover, in another interview, R. Karadjic (E.T. 2/2) was presented as a “star” and “Pale’s myth.” The journalist frequently justified Karadjic’s action “who saw his fellow countrymen tortured, built alive in concrete mixer of Muslims, beheaded by knives of Croats, with the victimizers then taking pictures with their trophies.” Karadjic too was presented as an unfairly treated person, victim of “the color-blind West”, whose “hatred for the Turkish conquerors is boiling.”

At the same time, there were many articles doubting the abilities and the genuine character of the Serbian opposition. “Foreign interference in Serbia which foments the opposition” (Eth. 28/12); “I cannot believe that the opposition leaders do not play their role, have no instructions and that they act out of mere ideology and patriotism.” (Ap. 8/12). Opposition’s “upstart heroes” (N. 14/1), “who are not the most capable for the roles that had been suddenly assigned to them, in spite of the fact that they may support democracy, freedom and human rights. And who knows what would happen if, suddenly, S. Milosevic disappeared from the scene and they were called to take over the leadership of the country?” (N. 14/1). “What a shame. Who would have expected from a people which stood united against the bullets and the hunger to humiliate themselves on party issues. (…) What are they looking for now? For Milosevic to go and get some kind of Yeltsin in his place or to have some liberal experience like Berisha’s, so as to enjoy … elections and liberalism. (…) What can I say. Demonstrations headed by the clergy! Muslims can only be happy and those who were bombing us until recently may now intervene to … help restore order.” (Ad.T. 7/2).

Turkey and the Turks

Most newspapers reproduce on every occasion the well-known stereotypes about barbarian, uncivilized, sly Turks etc. “Turkey is a huge hell, its system is an uncontrolled monster”, the Turkish state “a substitute of darkness and death”. “Ankara is built on a hill in the depths of the East, controlled by masses of soldiers and Islamists.” (Ap. 6/10). The Bishop of Zakynthos Chrysostomos wrote that “The Turks have nothing to do with Europe, they are not Europeans”; and, in the same newspaper, a reader added: “The Turks even today behave according to primitive instincts, like a few centuries ago when masses of their blood-lust conquerors knocked on the gates of Europe. And how does the civilized West react to the disobedient towards the international laws and agreements barbarian Asians?” (El. 2/10).

This negative image of these neighbors was boosted even more by the story on the relation between para-state, extreme right, nationalist organizations of Turkey with the state machine and high-ranked officials. The issue of the “Grey Wolves” was covered for quite some time by the Greek press. Its coverage became more extensive and frequent -with dossiers and leaders- especially when it was revealed that the “Grey Wolves” were implicated in forest fires in the Aegean islands, but also had possible connections with the minority in Thrace. “Three Mafiosi govern Turkey” (N. 7/12). “Three gangs ravage Turkey, shocking revelations by Yilmaz” (K. 7/12), “Grey Wolves and Turkish para-state” (El. 2/12). To underline that image of a state in complete disarray, with institutions and democratic principles destroyed, the Greek press often quoted sometimes complete articles on the subject from the foreign press: “New York Times: ‘Here is Ankara’s para-state’” (E.T. 11/12), “Times: ‘para-state elements and Mafia types act with the seal of the Turkish state’” (N. 11/12).

Efforts of overcoming this enmity were met with mixed reactions. A large section of the press saw a meeting of businessmen of the two countries very positively. “Make business not war. A message of hope” (El. 15/12); “A business bridge in Greek-Turkish relations. The first positive step” (E.T. 15/12); “Greece-Turkey: business brings us closer” (K. 8/12). However, another section of the press treated the subject with suspicion and skepticism. Characteristically, Eth. (12/12) gives such an impression with the title: “Turkey throws economic nets”. In the same page, in fact -and it was noteworthy- it presented news like “They steal tourists from us with ridiculously low prices”, “They want to sell water to our islands”, “Iraqi oil in Ankara’s hands.” All this news together created in the subconscious of the reader feelings of suspicion and sent the message that in practice the economic cooperation between Greeks and Turkish was inconceivable, since the latter were interested only in their interests and financial domination. Likewise, retired diplomat Michael Dountas wrote (N. 16/12) “invest and make peace, but Ankara unshaken lays claims on Greek sovereignty. That simple.” There were also reactions by some politicians according to El. (12/12). “The organizers (the Ipekci Greek-Turkish friendship award committee) were called ‘neo-collaborationists’ and the Greek participants in the meeting in Zappeio ‘naive’ by [deputies] S. Papathemelis, K. Badouvas, and G. Stathopoulos.”

Then, in March 1997, came the ‘shock’. “If Turkey has no place in European history, neither does Greece.” This heretic by Greek standards statement, which was made by Greek Foreign Minister Th. Pangalos, was in contradistinction to the standard negative stereotypes about Turkey; a position taken for the first time by a representative of the Greek government. The moment chosen was unique: it was when inside Turkey (with an Islamist party in power) discussions about the theocratic vs. the secular state were intensifying and when representatives of European states opposed the recognition of Turkey as a participant in the making of the Old Continent’s history and culture. Similar opinions had been expressed in the past, and continued to be expressed in the present, by Greek intellectuals. “If Europe is connected or united in the context of its institutions by common civilization, which constitutes a synthesis of the Greek and the Roman spirit as well as that of Christianity, and if all this is Europe of today and tomorrow, then Turkey, in the way she is structured, has no place in Europe. (...) It is indisputable that she is neither a democratic state nor a state of law. On the contrary - she oppresses, she exterminates minorities and all opponents on her territory, while she carries an imperialist policy.” (academic Ch. Gialouridis, El. 30/3).