POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE STEREOTYPES OF INTERNAL MINORITIES AND NEIGHBORING PEOPLES IN THE GREEK PRESS.

(April 1998 - September 1998)

Dimitris Angelidis

(With contributions by Tereza Boukis, Panayote Dimitras, Caterina Ghini, Mariana Lenkova, Nafsika Papanikolatos, Hebe Rocou, Christina Rougheri).

Media Monitored

The publications monitored are three daily newspapers published seven days a week: Eleftheros Typos [(E.T.), average January - June 1998 daily circulation of 52,908] - right-wing and quite nationalist and populist, Ethnos [(ETH.), 53,416, center-left and rather nationalist] and Eleftherotypia [(EL.), 75,179, center-left with occasional nationalist overtones]. One morning paper Kathimerini [(K.), 44,951, center-right and mildly nationalist], not published on Mondays; one evening paper Ta Nea [(N.), 97,470, centrist and mildly nationalist], which is not published on Sundays; and To Vima [(V.), 208,392, centrist and mildly nationalist], the Sunday newspaper printed by the publisher of Ta Nea. These newspapers have the largest circulation at the national level and cover all major political orientations and trends.

Internal Minorities Monitored

The following national, ethnolinguistic, religious minorities and immigrant communities in Greece are monitored: Macedonians (as well as Slavo-Macedonians), Turks, Roma (Gypsies), Pomaks, Vlachs, Arvanites, Catholics, Protestants, Jehovahs Witnesses, New Religious Movements and immigrants living in Greece. The composition minority populations is: Roma 3.3%, Arvanites 2%, Macedonians 2%, Vlachs 2%, Turks 0.5% and Pomaks 0.3%. Immigrants, most of them illegal, make up some 5%-6%. The religious minorities make up 1%. Members of minority groups -ethnic and religious- and immigrants have been subjected to various forms of discrimination.

Internal Minorities

Whichever group might threaten the perception of homogeneity of Greek society is considered ‘non-existent’ or is portrayed in a very negative way. With the exception of some articles published in the center-left press (mostly in ‘Eleftherotypia’), all papers have a negative attitude towards minorities be they ethnic, religious or cultural ones.

The Turkish minority (recognized as a Muslim minority by both the State and the press) is the most representative example, since Turkey is considered as Greece’s ‘Enemy No 1’. "The existence of a coherent minority inside the Greek territory could constitute a dangerous point of friction per se, all the more so when it satisfies all three necessary and sufficient conditions [it resides in the neighborhood of a metropolis, it is reproduced quicker than the Greeks, it has a different religion] conditions which, according to all international relations manuals, create an ‘irredentist problem’" (ET., 30/9).

Whenever minority MPs or the Consultative Committee of the Turkish Minority, an unofficial representative body of the minority in Western Thrace, claim their rights to self-determination and raise the issue of their exclusion from fundamental civil rights, they are directly accused of being a tool in Turkey’s hands. "Undisguised anti-Hellenic action is now developed by the Muslim MPs, and the parties’ leaders do not show the slightest disturbance at the international vilification of our country by persons who have been elected on these parties’ ballots!" (E.T. 20/5). "A Trojan Horse with a fez in the Rhodopes. The Turkish Consulate, together with hard-core Muslims, are trying to take advantage of the differences between political parties in order to promote candidates controlled by them" (Eth. 11/8).

Greek Foreign Minister Th. Pangalos’ visit to Western Thrace was marked by his statements on the role of "the American and the Turkish consulate authorities in Thessaloniki and Komotini" whom "he accused of hypocrisy and divisive policies." He added in a sharp tone that "there are others in Western capitals and in the Consulates of powerful Western countries in Thessaloniki, who -maybe due to excessive conscientiousness- come here and search in our drawers, wardrobes, souls to discover violations of human rights" (ETh. 27/7). The press willingly supported him: "That the Turkish Consulate of Komotini has been promoting for years contacts and activities ‘exceeding the limits’ is a well-known fact not only by the Greek government but also by all residents of this Thracian town" (K. 31/7). "The well-known burning issue of the Turkish Consulate of Komotini was raised by Th. Pangalos and we must congratulate him. […] However, Pangalos’ warnings on the activities of the Consulate are addressed also to some brainless local party cadres, who think that by making deals with the Turkish Consul under the table, they will benefit from the votes of the minority in the coming municipal elections (Eth., 30/7). After the Consultative Committee reacted to the statements of Mr. Pangalos’ and of Parliamentary President Ap. Kaklamanis -who suggested that the minority should be assimilated into the rest of the population- the papers became even more insulting. The Committee was characterized as an "informal and illegal body controlled by the local Turkish Consulate, which has become the wasps’ nest of the extremists" (E.T., 6/9), while the reactions were attributed to a "new diplomatic campaign of Ankara against the alleged campaign of the Greek authorities aiming at assimilating the minority. [...] Moreover, they have already been communicated to the competent services of the American State Department... to be used as a decoration for the next report on human rights in Greece".

The approaching municipal elections set off more comments of this kind. "Ankara attempted to dictate a ‘line’ to the Muslim voters of Thrace for the coming municipal and prefectural elections. [...] In practice Ankara [...] has already formed a kind of shadow government in Western Thrace, dictating not only developments but also election results, which in this case (due to the ‘Kapodistrias’ plan) are expected to be impressively fruitful for Turkish foreign policy" (E.T. 29/9). Of course, the article did not mention the complaints of the minority that the merger of communes into larger municipalities imposed by the "Kapodistrias plan" "did not bring out the real picture of the population composition of the Prefecture" (ETh. 11.8). The minority was restricted to just three municipalities from the seven it initially demanded. Furthermore, the article does not take into account that the mobility observed in Thrace before the elections came mainly from the Greek side: the area was visited by leaders of the Greek political parties, by Ministers, MPs, as well as by Archbishop Christodoulos.

Even when discrimination towards the Turkish minority is openly admitted, it is justified on the grounds of past and present discrimination of the Turkish State towards Greeks. " […] it is shamelessly hypocritical to lump together the injustices committed by the Turks and the ‘injustices’ of the Greeks against the coexisting populations. […] In Imbros and Tenedos and even in Istanbul the struggle is not for rights but for life itself. The blood of thousands who have been slaughtered is still moaning from the graves" (E.T. 17/7). "According to simple reasoning, it is not the Turks but the Greeks who should be indignant. Therefore, they will have to invent some other pretext in order to justify Turkish aggressiveness" (E.T. 21/4). Greece has double standards when it comes to minorities. Mr. Pangalos’ statements at the opening of the Greek Consulate in Albania are very characteristic. They clearly contradict his recent position as regards the role of the Turkish Consulate in Komotini. "[Mr. Pangalos] reminded us of the times when any attempt to open a Consulate in the Balkans was accompanied by hostility and reservations, expressed in the following questions: What do they want the Consulate for? Do they intend to spy on us? Do they want to take something from us? Do they wish to come in and do their own thing? These views - he said - were typical of oppressive regimes; he thus made a distinction between countries still possessed by this mentality and other countries which consider that the opening of a Consulate is a step forward in bilateral relations" (EL. 31/8).

There were, however, some exceptions to the widespread nationalistic positions. "What one becomes aware of is that the full inclusion of the minority into society demands the establishment of their right to self-determination" (EL. 27/8). "We don’t appoint them to administrative posts, we prevent them from being elected to posts in the local authorities (as Coalition MP Mustafa Mustafa has pointed out), why wouldn’t we appoint their teachers so that minority schools in Thrace function? [...] Won’t all those who insist on this unacceptable discrimination ever come to their senses? Are they so completely blinded?" (EL. 30/9). "Until when will Greece continue closing its eyes with its own hands to avoid seeing those whom it doesn’t want to embrace? Greek Muslims, Pomaks and Muslims of Turkish origin and national consciousness live in Greece after all. The question is the following: do they have the right to live here with full freedom of mind and consciousness? Are they equal before the Law or will their fatherland put them in jail, just as Turkey does at the opposite side of the border? If my friend and brother Dede feels he is a Greek or a Turk (or both), our Greece, the Greece of both of us, is not threatened! At long last, the Greece I love, loves Dede as well (even if the majority doesn’t know it, even if it has forgotten with time how to be hospitable, how to learn from other cultures) [...]" (N. 9/9).

Similarly negative, although to a smaller extent, is the attitude towards the Macedonian minority. Th. Pangalos’ interview to El. (13/4) is indicative: "In Greece, there is no Macedonian minority. Of course, I do not want to teach anybody any lessons, but I think that those who invent a minority are sick people, sick in their minds. And I am talking in this way, because they live in a country where basic political, social, material and other problems have already been solved." Even these statements were criticized as lenient. "At the same time, however, the person who heads Greek diplomacy let the window wide open to the self-determination of these people as … ‘Macedonian’ by saying: ‘There are people, however, who wish to develop such an identity (meaning ‘Macedonian’) and they are free to do so" (E.T. 13/4).

In July the European Human Rights Court recognized the right of Greek citizens of the Macedonian minority to found the Home of Macedonian Culture Association in Florina, and convicted Greece to a four million drachmas fine for violating the European Convention. However, press reports following the decision suggested that the defendants had not been vindicated. ‘Ios’ refers to the following indicative examples: "13/7/98 Vradini: ‘The European Court clarifies: Macedonia is Greek’. 13/7/98 Athinaiki: ‘The European Court ruled in favor of Greece.’"

The Greek media employed a lot of energy in the cultivation of the climate before and after the meeting organized in both Greece and Macedonia by the Aegean Macedonians’ Organization. The Greek press started dealing with the matter as soon as the meeting in Skopje began, thus preparing the Greek readers for the meeting designed to take place in Greek territory. "The Children of the Aegean Organization, with the support of the hawks of ‘progress’, raises the issue of a Macedonian minority in Greece and sharpens its knives again" (EL. 6/7). "Skopjans envisioning the annexation of Greek territories ... (...) During the meeting, the idea of a ‘Greater Macedonia’ was heard again " (N. 17/7).

In the middle of September the trial of the Macedonian minority party ‘Rainbow’, which had been accused in 1995 of "provoking mutual discord and disturbing public peace" because it had put outside its offices a board in the Macedonian language, took place. Although the news about the whole incident had been in the press for many days, the nine-hour trial and the decision acquitting ‘Rainbow’ hardly appeared in the papers. There were only two quite distanced articles in El. and two spiteful ones in ET. "Let’s point out that a Turk supporter of the ‘pro-Skopjans’ made his appearance in Court [...] and, of course, the well-known Panayotis Dimitras of ‘Helsinki Watch’ who, furthermore, did not hesitate to characterize the Muslims of Thrace as Turks!" (E.T. 16/9). "The chairwoman of the Court [...] tolerated the pro-Skopjans who called themselves ‘Macedonians’ as well as the representatives of foreign ‘humanitarian’ organizations accusing Greece, while she prevented a basic witness, journalist Tel. Kokos - contributor to ‘E.T’ - from testifying" (question to the Parliament by the MP Ev. Haitidis, quoted in E.T. 20/9).

Human rights activists and organizations for the support of ethnic minorities’ rights often face scornful remarks. "Mr. Dimitras (and his now orphaned organization [Greek Helsinki Monitor]), an ardent defender of ‘human rights,’ is financed by the notorious George Soros [...]. Mr. Soros is assisting Mr. Gligorov and the nationalists of the neighboring country in various ways. He finances them, promotes their views on the issue of ‘Aegean Macedonia, enslaved by Greeks’ and at the same time is sponsoring ... defenders of human rights" (EL. 3/8). "Certain self-complacent aggressive progressives who could be amusing under different conditions, remained speechless in front of the natural, nationalist hysteria of the neighbor country [Macedonia] [...] They also said nothing when Dede openly denounced that George Soros is sponsoring Mr. Dimitras’ organization. You see, Dede is a ‘material’ for exploitation only when he is persecuted by those who are ‘nation-minded’. […]" (EL. 15/9).

Nationalistic statements of the new Archbishop Christodoulos added fire to the discussion on the role of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Greek society. The progressive press stood for the constitutional separation of the State from the Orthodox Church, while the conservative press supported that Orthodox identity is tied with the Greek identity. Since the Orthodox religion is the official religion of Greece, religious minorities are considered potential internal enemies. Jehovah’s Witnesses are "victims of impostors" and of a "multinational publishing company", according to the Orthodox Church. "We are attacked by the millenarians, the enemies of Orthodoxy par excellence... On this issue we were expecting the Greek State to take a firmer stand. Instead, we have Ministers attacking the Archbishop..." (E.T. 24/8). Representatives of the Church, along with the conservative press, strongly criticized the President of the Republic for accepting a visit of the Old Calendarists. "In the name of equality before the law, [the President] committed a serious mistake. As the Spokesman of the Archbishop’s office, Archimandrite Ignatios told us, if for example, the unofficial and unrecognized by the Greek state mufti of Xanthi, supported by Ankara, decided to ask for a meeting, would the President receive him? And, if the Skopjans came to live in Greece and asked to see the President as ‘Macedonians,’ would he receive them? And furthermore, if a private police force called themselves ELAS and their chief asked the President to receive him, would he satisfy this wish?" (E.T. 4/6).

A scholarly work, which questioned the existence of the ‘Underground Schools’ and indirectly renounced the myth that presents the Orthodox Church as the exclusive guardian of the Greek tradition and Greek identity during the Ottoman period, was met with wrath. "It seems that the choosing of the moment for contesting the role of the clergymen during the Ottoman Domination just after the comments against Archbishop Christodoulos have ulterior motives […]. Once more, ‘the darts come from the ‘intimates.’" (K. 13/5). "It is crystal-clear that some ‘Greekling’ started the initiative for this shameful act which is shameful to the nation." [a letter by writer K. Sardelis, (K. 15/5)]. "[It is] an offense to the idyllic traditions of our people. […] Other peoples do not have traditions, so they fabricate them retrospectively. At the same time there are some allegedly progressive arty fellows among us who write our traditions off" [a letter by V. Kremmydas, (K., 22/5)].

Similar was the way in which some politicians and journalists, especially in Northern Greece, dealt with the ‘G. Babiniotis’ dictionary’ case. G. Babiniotis pointed out that the term ‘Bulgarian’ is also used in an insulting manner, referring to the way supporters of Northern Greek football teams are called by fans of teams in Central and Southern Greece. This reference raised a storm of protest: "lexicographic error"; an "impropriety"; a "great mistake"; "unholy" and "anti-national"; "unprecedented, unacceptable and abusive"; "a phrase which sets a dangerous precedent in favor of our neighbors who are on the alert for catching in mid air whatever the local counterfeit Greeks throw into their open mouths" – these were just a few of the reactions. There were also demands for legal measures against the author, and finally the court decided the temporary prohibition of the circulation of the dictionary. The decision was strongly criticized by the progressive press. Linguist Anna Fragoudaki recalled for the readers that the term ‘Bulgarian’ was used by the nationalists during the post-war period to characterize the Communists: "[…] back then it was used not only in the athletics grounds but also in school. Thus it was said that the Greek Communists ‘were not Greeks but Bulgarians’" (N. 27/5).

Since the Greek language is considered to be a constituent part of both the Greek identity and the coherence of society, any attempts to question its exclusiveness are regarded as suspicious. In consequence, public opinion rejects not only any mother tongue teaching programs for the linguistic minorities, but also any scientific research on minority languages. "What is difficult (?) for somebody to understand is the ‘feeling’ of all those ignorant people for the languages of ‘minority groups’ in our country. They obviously open the road for the future establishment of ‘minority’ schools and other unexpected phenomena. […]I was surprised to hear that the Romanian government provides grants to students from Vlach-speaking villages of the area, upon submission of a certificate issued by the ‘competent Greek services’ (certifying that they are indeed vlachophones). I wonder whether there are such (competent) Greek services issuing such certificates!" (EL, 14/8). "The aim is the division, the destruction of our people. […] Wherever a minority language is recognized, a minority ethnicity is also recognized!" (E.T. 19/6).

The most conservative part of the press took an extreme xenophobic attitude toward the increasing flow of immigrants in Greece. "Common sense and elementary consistence impose the application of the Italian method in Greece too!" (E.T. 12/8). The Italian method was praised on various occasions. "Were the Italians stupid, then, when they sank them into the sea and then gave us stories about an accidental collision?’" (El. 5/4). The decision of the government to legalize the immigrants was strongly criticized on the grounds that it ratifies the ‘infiltration with foreign elements’ of the Greek homogenous population. "[...] demographic aging, the absolute decrease of the population and the massive, legal or illegal migration, are complemented by the devastation of areas of strategic importance" (E.T., 3/8). "If our doors remain open the invasion will take huge dimensions and then every corrective move will be impossible... [...] Our own socialists are not irresponsible for this nightmarish Balkan invasion, threatening to develop into FOREIGN OCCUPATION and very possibly into ARMED OCCUPATION" (E.T. 30/9).

Criminality and unemployment are ‘all time classic’ arguments against the immigrants. "Running the danger to be characterized... a racist, a chauvinist, a reactionary etc. I repeat that mass migration -illegal migration- has led to record unemployment, criminality and social disintegration" (ET., 4/9). The answer comes from some progressive voices: "It is well-known from statistics that the percentage of participation of economic migrants to the increase of criminality is very low [...]" (K. 30/9). Sorin Matei, a criminal who led Greek Police to one of its greater fiascoes, was reported in most papers as a ‘Romanian’, even though he grew up in Greece with a Greek mother. As And. Karkayiannis pointed out "The reason for this falsification is simple and obvious: they want to create false impressions and excite our racist instincts against the foreigners who were unfortunate to come to our country to find a better fate..." (K. 8/9).

Xenophobia found its way to even into the Greek Parliament. At a Parliamentary all-party committee which discussed the security of the borders, New Democracy MP Ap. Andreoulakos maintained that "we should send the Albanians away and if they come back, send them to concentration camps and to Makronissia [exile islands]" (El. 21/5). ND MP G. Karataferis, on the other hand, claimed that a financial audit ("a means test") should be carried out for all immigrants who live and work in Greece. The majority of the press however sharply criticized these positions as racist, fascist and inconceivable.

The coverage of the strike of Albanian and Romanian workers in Magnesia with demands for pay raise and establishment of an eight-hour workday was typical of the different attitude of the Greek newspapers, depending on their political orientation. "Unheard of blackmail by …Albanian strikers in Magnesia" (E.T. 27/5) on one hand and "Their strike obliges us to see them as persons absolutely mature, capable of acting in a spirit of solidarity" K. (28/5) on the other. The progressive press revealed that personal financial interests are often the basis of xenophobic attitudes. "At Yiannitsokhori, the rage against Albanians began when the immigrants got organized and started negotiating wages and conditions of work. Let us relax. My compatriots are not racists, they are just self-righteous." (V. 12/4). Full of criticism were the progressive papers’ articles dealing with the short imprisonment sentence given to a Greek rural constable for killing an Albanian when the latter was found in the watermelon field of the former, stealing a watermelon. "But also on the scales of Justice the life of the Albanian did not carry much weight. The Court ‘exhausted all the margins for leniency’ and unanimously ‘acquitted’ the defendant. […] That’s it, then, descendants of Socrates. Shoot them fatally. Our tomatoes, watermelons, old shoes forgotten in the furrows of the fields… They are all precious, they are valuables." (El., 9/4).

Albania and the Albanians

The image of a poor country, ravaged by criminality, uncertainty and internal instability is the prevailing one when it comes to Albania. The political crisis in August and September is depicted as if being inherent to the very foundations of Albanian society. "[There is a] chronic contradiction between ‘two Albanias.’ [...] Fatos Nano’s job is very difficult, because of the overall corruption and the traditional propensity of the Albanians to function in ‘captaincies’, instead of within the system of the Rule of Law" (K. 20/9). "Post-Cold War Albania indeed functions in a regime of complete anarchy and of chaotic antagonism between the interests of the Mafia, controlling the state and the political system to a great extent; the interests of the ‘government’ and ‘state’ bureaucracy, exploiting and plundering international help" (El, 27/9).

The Islamic attacks against the American embassies of Kenya and Tanzania gave food to a series of articles referring to the presence of Islamic terrorists in Albania. These are reportedly involved in illegal arms and drugs trafficking, and financing of the Kosovo Liberation Army. "Taking advantage of the general break-down of customs control along the Albanian coastline and trying to prop up the new Islamic resistance front in Kosovo, the network was involved in drug traffic towards the East and the West" (K. 11/8). "Albania, the paradise of Islamic terrorists" (E.T. 11/8).

The Greek press is generally favorable to the attempts of Fatos Nano’s government to modernize the country. This is mainly due to Sali Berisha’s attitude towards the Greek minority in southern Albania in the past, as well as to some of his statements about Greece, which were considered anti-Hellenic. However, Nano is also portrayed as a prisoner of his own hesitancy, of the opposition, of state corruption and of friction in his relations with the President of Albania. "Berisha threatens Nano with arms" (EL. 29/8) and "Albania is a boiler ready to explode" (E.T. 29/8).

Despite the chaotic situation in the neighboring country, Greek-Albanian relations seem to be very good. However, we must point out that in the descriptions of Greek-Albanian relations in the Greek papers there is a sense of Greek superiority, treating Albania as a poor relative. "Relations with Albania stand on firm ground [...] ‘Greek-Albanian relations are built on a firm basis and have reached the best possible point after the founding of the Albanian state’ the Ambassador of Greece in Tirana, Mr. Prevedourakis, stressed. ‘Greece is a vital partner of Albania, helping it to find its way towards Europe. For Greece the stabilization of the situation in Albania is a basic precondition." (K. 11/8).

Despite the good bilateral relations at the highest state level, the image of the Albanians, which the ordinary Greeks embrace, remains very negative. Daily reports on the participation of Albanians in all sorts of criminal offenses, mainly thefts, hashish traffic and violence have made the name ‘Albanian’ synonymous to criminality and poverty. From time to time the press discovers, always to its surprise, cases of ‘good’ Albanians and presents them as exceptions to the rule. The exhibition of 19 Albanian ceramists organized in Athens with the assistance of El is a typical example of this. "This exhibition - Mr. Fyndanidis [director of EL.] said - is a proof that our suffering neighbor, which has experienced oppression and distress for centuries, never abandoned the cultivation of art and of the sense of beauty." "The time has come for mentalities to change, for sympathetic eyes to be turned to that tormented country and to its residents who do not at all differ in their inner lives from us, the ‘civilized’ ones." (N. 30/6).

Bulgaria and the Bulgarians

Bulgaria’s acute economic problems and the transition process towards an open and liberal economy are the two factors, which characterize the image of the country. "It is a country where everybody lives under conditions of severe poverty. However, there are 1,500 individuals who lead a life equivalent to that of Hollywood tycoons. […] They are ‘a new ruling class.’ Certain people call them entrepreneurs, others say it more clearly - ‘people of the Mafia’" (N. 15/4). "It reminds me of Greece of the 50s and the 60s when people were trying to stand on their feet and to find a way to live with dignity. The majority of people is kind and has a deeply embedded culture despite the difficult times. […] On the other hand, it is tragic to observe all this rage in the neighboring countries over who will invade the newly created markets". (N., 27/6). "In the past, the Palace of Culture in Sofia used to host conferences, lectures, party meetings and cultural events. Now, in the same Palace of Culture, fashion shows are held… Bulgaria has reconciled itself with the decision that it will proceed towards its regeneration by following all the rules of the market" (Eth. 9/4). One can observe a slight tone of irony and superiority, when it comes to Bulgaria. "If somebody visits Sofia today, maybe the first thing which will impress them will be the absence of soldiers in its paved streets. [...] The Bulgarian army today [...] is not in a state of disintegration. However, the government does not have the money to sustain it [...] The people of this country, neo-antimilitarist at first sight, have made it an immediate priority of their foreign and defense policy to have the headquarters of the multinational Balkan force in Bulgaria [...]" (V. 13/9).

A considerable improvement in the relations between the two countries can be observed between the visit of the Bulgarian Prime Minister to Greece in April and the visit of his Greek opposite number to Bulgaria in September. In the first case, the press spoke about "caution’ on the part of the Bulgarian interlocutors" (V., 18&19/4) attributed to the different political preferences of the two governments, as well as the "pro-Turkish" attitudes of the right wing Bulgarian government. "This does not mean that the relations between the two countries are bad, but from the very first moment the neighbors treated our country with reservation and mistrust. There are many that claim that up to a certain point they still have reservations today. However, after yesterday’s meeting between Mr. Simitis and Mr. Kostov, sources close to the Prime Minister spoke of a change in the Bulgarian position" (El., 27/8).

Finally, the nuclear power station in the Bulgarian town of Kozlodui consistently provokes criticism on the part of the Greek press. "Bulgaria, according to all indications, will neither retreat at the pressure, nor respect the agreements to suspend the operation of Kozlodui’s dangerous units. [...] On the contrary, it will carry on, as it does today, exploiting politically the international interest raised by the issue, in order to satisfy other aspirations. [...]" (K. 13/9).

Macedonia and the Macedonians

The relations between Greece and Macedonia are being restored slowly, yet steadily. First of all this is due to Greece’s economic penetration in the country and second, to the recognition that the ‘name issue’ is a lost case for Greece which may just harm its international image. "Relations are very, very good. However, we lost a project undertaken by the Chinese, most probably because of the reservations caused by the activities of the nationalist lobby in Northern Greece" (a table on the relations between Greece and the other Balkan countries, N. 12/9).

However one should not conclude that the anti-Macedonian campaign of the recent past is nonexistent now. On the contrary, the name ‘Macedonia’ is still a taboo for the Greek press (including the non-conservative one as well). Eleftherotypia (19/7) published a translation of an article of Le Monde Diplomatique. In it, the word ‘FYROM’ substituted the initially used word ‘Macedonia.’ Although in the English edition of Kathimerini the word used to describe the country was FYR of Macedonia, the original Greek edition of the same newspaper used the name of the capital of the country (Skopje) instead, or simply put ‘Macedonia’ in inverted commas (K., 31/7). The Greek edition of the Amnesty International’s June report calls the Macedonian minority of Greece ‘Slavomacedonian’ and its language, ‘Slavomacedonian dialect’, although the word ‘Macedonia’ is used in the English version which also mentions ‘language’ not ‘dialect.’

K. Gligorov’s speech in June on the constitutional name of his country was mostly seen as a clear manifestation of unredeemed claims. "New unredeemed cries from Gligorov" (El, 26/6). During the same period, the Macedonians of Bulgaria mobilized themselves for the abolition of the Bucharest Treaty and the recognition of their right to found an organization promoting the rights of the Macedonians of Bulgaria. The entire press saw these activities as a coordinated and threatening propaganda of those who wish to raise border issues. "‘Iliden’ carries on its illegal activities for the ‘autonomy’ … despite the fact that the organization was declared illegal and was banned by Bulgarian Justice immediately after a handful of so-called ‘Macedonians’ founded it five years ago" (E.T. 4/8). The article fails to mention the fact that the European Court has accepted the appeal of this organization, which seeks its recognition denied by the Bulgarian State. "Three ‘Macedonian’ organizations (in Bulgaria, in Greece and in Albania) are trying with shameless propaganda and unacceptable falsification of history to create conditions for the ‘Macedonian dream’ to come true in due time" (EL. 8/8).

The articles referring to Romania are still very few, mainly in the economy sections of the papers. They deal with the economic course of the country and the margins for closer business relations between Greece and Romania. The image of the Romanians, however, follows two repetitive trends in the Greek press. Romanian women are constantly present on the lists of East European prostitutes coming to Greece. Romanian men, on the other hand, are very often included on the lists of usual suspects when thefts, robberies or other mild crimes are reported.

Serbia and the Serbs

With the exception of Eleftheros Typos, which holds an openly pro-Serbian stand, the rest of the press is either trying to be neutral or adopts the positions of the international community concerning the situation in Kossovo. "Had the Albanian-speaking minority of Serbia (the majority in the province of Kosovo) enjoyed a minimum of human rights ensuring individual dignity, it wouldn’t have sought an independent state entity" (N 6/6).

In mid-August, Defense Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos made a statement in which he blamed the crisis on Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. This statement prompted both sides of the Greek media world to express their views. Most of the papers sided with the Minister’s statement and pointed out that the pro-Serbian period of Greece is over. Ta Nea pointed out the four basic reasons, which brought about the end of the policy of axes and the distancing away from Serbia. First of all Serbia did not support Greece on the name issue of Macedonia. Then Greece as also improved its relations with Albania. And last, but not least, Greece is a member of authoritative international bodies and cannot consider human rights an internal affair of Yugoslavia (N. 21/8). "Greeks were right when they favored Serbia, while the Westerners […] were working for the undermining and the break-up of Yugoslavia. […] This phase is over. Milosevic, after having settled, started playing games for his personal political survival. He abandoned without a battle the ages-old Serbian cradles of Croatia and Bosnia [...] At the same time he continued with the manslaughter in Bosnia, and ended it under American pressure by shamelessly selling out Karazic and Mladic when they stopped serving his plans. [...] Why should our people feel any sympathy when a crime is committed?" (K. 18/8).

This change of attitudes was nevertheless rather superficial. In September Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos made a diametrically opposite statement in which he expressed his solidarity with many points of Milosevic’s policy. He justified his points by referring to a meeting with representatives of the Kosovo Liberation Army, who presented themselves as advocates of the idea of Greater Albania and warned that after Kosovo, they will demand the rights of the Albanians who live in Macedonia and in Greece. Most of the press adopted the pro-Serbian approach of the Minister.

It is easier for Serbian positions to find their way into the Greek press than for Albanian ones. In August were published two interviews of the Serbian Press Minister, Alexander Vusic (E.T. 4/8 and ETh. 17/8) and one interview of the Yugoslav Ambassador to Greece, Dr. Vutizevic (EL. 25/8). In all three interviews the official Serbian line is presented without any criticism on the part of the journalists. Needless to say that the views of the Kosovo Albanians never appeared in public. There was a single report last month in which they complained that Greek media adopt the Serbian position (EL. 16/8).

It should also be noted that the Greek press uses the term ‘Albanian-speaking people’ instead of ‘Albanians’ to comply with Greece’s general position of non-recognition of ethnic minorities in its own territory.

Turkey and the Turks

Eleftherotypia and a few other papers have articles, which try to refute the negative image and to promote a cooler approach to the situation on the basis of peaceful coexistence of the two peoples. However, the prevailing image is that of intense contradictions, serious internal problems, militarism, democratic deficit and total disrespect of human rights (of the Islamists, the Curds, the Armenians, and the press…). "The present day Kemalist Turkey cannot endure the consequences of democratization. Respect for human rights and observance of the rules of parliamentary democracy is not compatible with the structure of the modern Turkish State. If Turkey became democratic, it would disintegrate" (N. 17/4). "The Turkish pseudo-democracy, which is supervised by the military leadership playing a ‘guarantor’s’ role, is staggering. […] The Turkish system of the so-called Kemalism has been led to an impasse. It will be able to survive only by means of civil or military coup d’etats, and this does not help in any way the ‘European orientations’ of Ankara." (K. 15/5). "It is exactly the structure of Turkish society and its crippled political system which close in upon the country. […] The military establishment has imposed the regime for suppression of people’s freedom in order to safeguard the secular character of the state. And this is exactly what reinforces the Islamic movement" (Eth. 22/5). "It is about a state which, since the beginning of the 20th century and by means of a lot of crimes and genocide, violates human rights, often surpassing Nazi Germany in ferocity. At present it is at the highest point of world unreliability and aversion" [letter to the editor, K. (28/5)].

The tension in Greek-Turkish relations is entirely charged on the Turkish side, presented as the most intransigent, unreliable and imperialist country in the Balkans. Some Turkish officials’ statements given to various international media refer to the aggressive stand of Greece against Turkey. They are described as successful Turkish propaganda, while the Greek State is criticized for not achieving the promotion of Greek interests. "The Turks do not use the Greek retreats in order to look for some kind of conciliation but in order to further promote their positions to our detriment [...]" (E.T. 17/9). "The Turkish political scene does not leave much room for the Greek-Turkish relations to come out of the swamp where they have been bogged since last year. As long as the Edzevit logic is prevailing, I don’t think that we may expect anything" (K. 23/9). "Everyone knows that Greece does not follow an aggressive policy. On the contrary, it is continuously defending and excusing itself" (ETh. 3/9).

The rapprochement between Turkey and Israel is considered as a priori anti-Greek, despite the fact that both parties denied this interpretation. "The creation of an informal axis with Turkey functions as a factor of destabilization. It increases the mistrust of all neighbors which draw conclusions on the basis of actions and not on appeasing statements" (K. 8/9). Still, in Greece itself, the view in favor of the creation of a Greek-Orthodox bow in the Balkans, which will counteract the Muslim element, is not entirely abandoned, especially in the conservative circles. Finally, Turkey’s intention to build a nuclear power station in Akuyu is covered by the press both because of its environmental implications and because of Turkey’s secret intention to produce nuclear arms. The view expressed is that in case Turkey proceeds with such production, Greece should follow suit.