Media Monitoring

-

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE STEREOTYPES IN THE GREEK PRESS ON INTERNAL MINORITIES AND NEIGHBORING PEOPLES:

APRIL 1997 - SEPTEMBER 1997

Mariana Lenkova

(with contributions by Panayote Dimitras, Nafsika Papanikolatou, Hebe Rocou, and Christina Rougheri)

ABSTRACT

Heated discussions on the forthcoming repeal of Art. 19 of the Greek Citizenship Law. Continuous denial of the existence of a Macedonian and a Turkish minority coupled with a hostile attitude full of suspicion towards the minority leaders. Traditional intolerance for the religious minorities, despite the important decisions against Greece reached by the European Court on Human Rights. Increased number of articles on the illegal immigrants, due to the latter’s pending legalization. Some texts are openly racist, blaming everything on the immigrants, while there are occasional self-critical articles, full of sympathy for the foreigners who are treated like slaves. Historical "evidence" is brought to demonstrate the inability of the Albanians to be protagonists in the new developments in their country, while incidents at the common border trigger intense Albanophobia. At the same time, there is restrained optimism for the future of the neighbor, as well as increased interest in the Greek minority there. After the elections in Bulgaria - fear of pro-Turkish tilt of the new government, which is strengthened by President Stoyanov’s official apology to Turkey for the suffering of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Still, a positive climate as regards bilateral relations and detailed discussions on the common Bulgarian-Macedonian heritage which reached their peak in August with the equation Macedonians=Bulgarians. Contradictory coverage of Theodorakis’ concert in Skopje, as well as numerous articles on the internal Macedonian problems. Occasional treatment of the "name issue" characterized by a climate of supremacy on the part of Greece. For the first time - articles on a Greek minority in the neighboring country. Romania is still the least covered Balkan state, with articles on the economic situation there. The critical attitude towards Milosevic’ policy goes on in addition to self-criticism for the past support given to him. Analyses of Serbian-Croatian relations and of bilateral problems with Greece, due to visa restrictions. The image of "barbaric", "undemocratic" Turkey is omnipresent. Moreover, in August the media began presenting Turkey as the "spitting image" of Hitler’s Germany, which is suggestive of the unacceptability of Turkey’s membership to the EU. Steps towards bilateral cooperation and friendship are "read" in different ways by the pro-government and the opposition press.

We present here the analysis and reconstruction of the images formed by eight Greek newspapers of all political tendencies on Balkan neighbors and on religious, ethnic and linguistic minorities in Greece. After the end of the cold war era, nationalist passions have risen, enhanced by the church, the educational institutions, the political world and the mass media. They helped develop feelings of Greek superiority, of national affront, and of threats from foreigners, minorities of all kinds, illegal immigrants and refugees coming to Greece in recent years. The lack of an established scholarly tradition in treating the complicated historical, economic, political and social issues is reflected in the lack of knowledge which characterizes most journalists. Moreover, there is a common editorial line of all newspapers, when dealing with sensitive ‘national’ issues.

Media Monitored

The publications monitored are five daily newspapers published seven days a week: Apogevmatini (average first semester 1997 daily circulation of 51,603 copies), Adesmeftos Typos (48,452), Eleftheros Typos (65,314) -all right-wing and quite nationalist; Ethnos (58,681; center-left and rather nationalist) and Eleftherotypia (84,553; center-left with occasional nationalist overtones); one morning paper, Kathimerini (43,121; center-right and mildly nationalist), not published on Mondays; two evening papers Exousia (50,284; center-left with occasional nationalist overtones) and Ta Nea (99,474; centrist and mildly nationalist) which are not published on Sundays; and To Vima (centrist and mildly nationalist), the Sunday newspaper which is published by the publisher of Ta Nea. They are the newspapers with the largest circulation at national level and cover all major political orientations and trends.

Internal Minorities Monitored

The minority groups in Greece monitored are the following national, ethnolinguistic, religious, social and immigrant minority communities: Macedonians (as well as Slavomacedonians), Turks, Roma (Gypsies), Pomaks, Vlachs, Arvanites, Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, New Religious Movements and Immigrants. The composition of the minority population is Roma 3.3 %, Arvanites 2%, Macedonians 2%, Vlachs 2%, Turks 0.5% and Pomaks 0.3%. (Mostly illegal) immigrants make up some 5%-6%. The religious minorities make up 1%. The members of minority groups -ethnic and religious- and the immigrants all face various forms of discrimination.

Internal Minorities

The forthcoming repeal of Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Law provoked many negative commentaries in the media which try to present the issue as one endangering national security and peace. "The modernizers’ government is proceeding at full speed towards repealing Art. 19 in an attempt to serve Turks, ‘Macedonians’ but also Albanians (on a more long-term perspective...). And you can be sure that not only will the agents of Turkey and the ‘children of the Aegean Sea’ come back, but they will also claim fortunes" (E.T. 3/8). "‘If those residing in the celebrated city [Athens] have decided to deliver Thrace undefended to the claws of Turkish greed, we shall resist with all our forces’" (Metropolite Demaskinos, Ap. 18/9).

Both the media and society in general continue to deny the existence of the Macedonian and the Turkish minorities: "who denies that Skopjans are a distinct Slavic nation and that a small and negligible percentage of the population of Macedonia before the Civil War was made up of this Slavic group? However, they joined fascist Bulgaria and the fascist Communist Party of Greece to throw out the genuine Macedonians" [which implies, of course, the Greek Macedonians] (a letter to the editor, El.5/5). "Each person has the right to call oneself as they wish. I call myself a Greek. Another person may call himself/herself a Turk. No one, however, has the right to give others a name. We cannot say that the whole minority in Thrace is Turkish. There are Pomaks, Gypsies, as well as citizens of Turkish origin." (Eth. 15/5).

When, however, representatives of these minorities try to speak for themselves this is seen as "New provocation by Skopjanophiles! Florina on the alert because of the manifestation organized by Rainbow [the political party of the Macedonian minority in Greece]" (E.T.30/4). That is why everything related to the minorities is treated with much skepticism and suspicion. "The situation in Thrace is beyond control.(…) The spies, the well known MIT (who are not that secret) do whatever they want; they have gone as far as organizing a fund raising for the …Turkish army. What will be their next initiative? The creation of an open Muslim university which will be controlled by Ankara and will serve the objectives of Turkish expansionism." (E.T. 11/6).

As regards the religious minorities, a number of important decisions on the conscientious objectors and on religious liberties have been reached by the European Court on Human Rights. However, the press did not change its intolerant positions, while presenting any interference from abroad as unwelcome and suspicious. " (…) it does not mean that Greece will give in to these methods. At no circumstance should our country give in to such pressures and blackmailing. Whoever refuses to serve to the fatherland - against all other young Greeks who wear the uniform - has no place in Greek society. And, instead of imprisoning them, we should rather refuse issuing them passports, identity cards and any other official documents! This is enough!" (A.T. 11/6).

The period under review is characterized by numerous texts on the immigrants in the country and on their pending (for the umpteenth time) legalization. There are numerous examples of scare-mongering articles, reaching racist nuances. "A new wave of mass illegal immigration in sight. From the moment that the government accepted a procedure for the registration and at least the temporary legalization of the Albanian illegal immigrants in Greece, a great incentive has been offered to the wretched and suspects of the neighboring country for coming to Greece to get registered and legalized!" (E.T. 6/8). "The legalization of the illegal immigrants who have flooded Greece is a true crime against our country. It is certain that tragic situations await our unfortunate country, because those illegal immigrants have come mainly from neighboring countries which have claims on our territories. (...) We beg Mr. Prime Minister to not get minorities settled here, to not do such a great harm against Greece" (G. Pantazoglou’s letter, Eth. 8/9).

Illegal immigration are seen as the ones to blame for most of the bad things in Greece - from the rise of criminality in recent years ["It is not accidental that simultaneously with the invasion of the immigrants from the North and the East, criminality also skyrocketed. The Greeks in the borderlands live under a regime of democracy under occupation, with the Albanians’ gangs coming in and out, while other gangs dominate also the Basin. Circuits of Albanian, Russian, Bulgarian and Romanian criminals indulge in orgies all over the country, in the absence of any resistance. What is there left to do? What else than self-defense!" (E.T. 20/8)] to the dissemination of infections ["‘We are afraid to go near the aliens less ‘we get infected’ and carry to our children any contagious diseases from which most of them suffer’, say with despair the trade unionist policemen who live daily in a tragedy having to guard aliens" (E.T. 30/9)].

At the antipode of all the above are scant articles showing sympathy for the immigrants, because "(…) it is a myth that these inexpensive hands are not needed. On the contrary, these are wanted more than anything else. But it is for this reason that they will have to become slaves and a model for the rest of the working people. We have said it repeatedly. (We have said it). Human rights have a high price and they burden the production cost of the final product." (El. 8/9). Some papers condemned also the police raids against the illegal (mainly Albanian) immigrants. "All the Albanian illegal immigrants in our country are not ‘Mafiosi’ as the latter constitute an insignificant minority... The thousands upon thousands of Albanians who toil for a day’s wages of four or five thousand drachmas, far from being criminals, they are the most frequent victims of their ‘Mafiosi’ fellow-countrymen." (N. 23/7). "Poor Albanian brothers of ours, economic refugees under savage exploitation and extreme disdain, water the Greek soil with their fertile sweat and, at times, they get gathered in police vans like mad dogs and they get deported from the official border door, only to come back frightened to death through the window of the mountains. On Albanian territory, Greek gangsters with sonorous posts in the Greek consulates rob them for a ‘visa.’" (A.T. 7/8).

Albania and the Albanians

While the situation in the neighboring country remained rather unstable and dangerous, the Greek media made extensive use of the usual images of chaos, saying "that the Albanians are not doing something new. This has been their official [sic] work since bygone times. They have always lived that way - by plundering and killing. Illyrians were not either farmers or stock-breeders. They were professional plunderers (…) I don’t know where things will go with these katsapliades [thieves] who have now become even more insolent (…) and shoot in cold blood." (A.T. 7/5). "Chaos is a lenient characterization. Even chaos has certain limits. Here nothing is sustainable. The Albanian officials don’t hide their wish to stop this misfortune, and that another (…) country attends to their country. They should divide the responsibility between Italy and Greece so that they feel a little bit like a state!" (El. 1/6). "Albanians evolve into the ignominy of Europe. We support them, feed them, give them work and help, we send our children there to defend them and to take care of them. But they rob us, plunder us, kill us, they fill our country with drugs and worst of all - they hate us. Not only they don’t thank us for everything we do for them, since gratitude is an unknown word in their modern vocabulary, but they hate us. (Ap. 29/4).

Abundant historical "evidence" is brought forth in order to demonstrate the inability of the Albanians to be protagonists in the new developments. "Albanians may be notorious for their (…) lack of patriotism from the period of the Turkish occupation and during the Italian occupation" (A.T. 9/5). "It is true that, during the 19th century, when the Balkans were shaking by the explosion of national consciousness which resulted in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Albanians were the last ones who achieved to be self-determined collectively as a nation and, to a great extent, to shake off their feudal relations, their state was established only on the 28th November, 1912." (Ex. 14/8).

Although there was an overwhelming pessimism about the normal conduct of the elections ["Whatever the outcome of the Albanian elections would be, one thing is certain, namely that the influence of the Greek minority in Albania will continue to deteriorate. Against the background of the Turkophile Berisha supporters, the traditionally bad relations which the Albanian Socialists have with Greece and the hatred against the minority fostered by the lawless of the North, the optimistic prospects are rather meager" (E.T. 27/6)], little by little the Greek papers started showing a somewhat restrained optimism for the future of Albania ["However, it will take efforts to consolidate democracy. For, as is known to everybody, Albania is deprived not only of what in other countries is self-evident and basic with regard to democratic political institutions as well as infrastructure of the economy. Until yesterday it was in the whirlpool of civil war conflicts, corruption and terrorism..." (N. 1/7)].

There are even occasional self-critical articles. "No, Albanians are not only characterized by despair, wretchedness, violence, opportunism and corruption. They are also characterized, like all other people in the world, by patience, trust, innocence, goodness. The mere recognition of the fact that the belonging to a particular race does not provide a social identity could attack and disarm our xenophobia" (K. 6/6). However, an intense climate of Albanophobia is developed whenever there are incidents of violence in areas along the Greek-Albanian border. "People were reaping their crops at a village in Kastoria. Albanian bumps, armed to the teeth, arrested them, kidnapped them to Albania and asked for ransom in order to let them free! In what country of the civilized world can such unobstructed invasions take place by bandits who steal, kidnap, kill defenseless citizens, and where nobody reacts? What country will accept to be treated as a state of clouts by some tens or hundreds of Albanian scoundrels (we have written this in the past and without any racist spirit: There is no worse tribe, no filthier people than the Albanians). Who is going to smash these unhesitating goat thieves and bandits, who became insolent only because there is no reaction?" (Ap. 22/7).

And last but not least, it should be kept in mind that after the elections the interest in the Greek minority in Albania has become more pronounced. "What if the government in Albania has changed. What if Greece makes everything possible to assist the friendly Albanian people. What if only warm words are heard from Athens and Tirana... The Albanian consulate in Athens gets annoyed when we call the Greeks in Albania, Epirotes from the North. A distinguished Athens lawyer stated that he speaks on behalf of an Epirote from the North client of his, only to be immediately criticized: ‘There are no Epirotes from the North, sir, we will not cut Albania in half’. The upgrading of the Greek-Albanian relations in its full grandeur..." (Ap. 29/8). "Legalization of the Albanians without Greek schools in Northern Epirus and respect for the Orthodox Church in Albania cannot be thought of. (…) The problem is that the government does not seem to have grasped the Albanian tactics and, in its haste to ‘embrace’ Nano and the Socialists (as it did with Berisha a few months ago), it seems that, once more, it will forget the Epirotes from the North." (E.T. 11/9).

Bulgaria and the Bulgarians

In the beginning of the period, Bulgaria kept its image of a poor and devastated country, which was to change gradually. "Drowned in poverty, black economy and under the domination of organized crime, Bulgarians are carried away to vote with one particular idea on their mind - the fury against corruption and crime…" (Ap. 19/4). "They even sell their relatives’ corpses! 82% of the population of Bulgaria is below the poverty level" (K, 15/4).

The outcome from the early general elections in Bulgaria gave rise to many articles on the fear of a pro-Turkish tilt of the new government. "The victorious political party traditionally boasts good relations with Ankara and the party of the Turkish minority. (…) The country’s international relations are dependent mainly on its internal situation which, in spite of the majority that has been assured by the coalition of the Union of Democratic Forces, is fragile." El (21/4). "it is not impossible to rekindle the Greater Bulgaria spirit which will go along together with Turkey." (Ap. 27/4).

The period before and after Bulgarian President Stoyanov’s visit to Greece saw a number of positive articles on the cooperation between "[Bulgarians and Greeks who are] condemned to live together, not only as neighbors, but also as friends. (…) Bulgaria like Greece belongs geographically, culturally and politically to Europe." (B, 29/6, statement by the Bulgarian President). "Stoyanov is arriving in Athens today, after eight years, a Bulgarian President visits Greece officially" (Ex. 2/7)

However, the President of the neighboring country lost his "most favored" status as soon as some articles in reaction to "a Bulgarian minority in Greece" were published. "Enough of us pulling our pants down - not only for the Turks- but for the Skopjans and the Bulgarians, and on the other hand ...blustering, for internal consumption. If the Bulgarian President, Petar Stoyanov, were to make any hints about a ‘Bulgarian minority’, we should make hints about the Greek Sarakatsani. And so on and so forth also with regard to the greatly talkative Mr. Kiro Gligorov!" (A.T. 1/8).

President Stoyanov was reproached also for his unforgivable apology extended to the Turks for the years of oppression suffered by the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. "The new President of Bulgaria has apologized to Ankara. Surely, the man receives orders from the USA, but has he not wondered, even if once, whether throughout history the Turks have apologized for the atrocities they have committed against Greek populations. Eventually, they will get us to call Zhivkov to mind..." (E.T. 3/8).

Just like for the other countries, here again the Greek papers are publishing articles with "deep historical insights." "(…) Today’s Bulgarians are exactly the progeny of this admixture. Besides, the word BULGA means mixture in Turkish. Byzantium recognized their state, but they remained a barbaric, uncivilized and dangerous people for the Empire’s borders." (Ap. 22/6). "On the basis of a prearranged plan, the Bulgarians began massive massacres among the Macedonian Greeks. In Drama, over 1,500 were executed, while the murderers were cutting off the heads of the Greeks and were playing soccer at the central square of the town - this is the nature of the Slavo-Turks." (Ap. 28/9). A few days after the last mentioned article, only El. (30/9) presented "the other aspect of the story." "Bulgarian representatives from the first level of local authorities have asked forgiveness for the mistakes made by their ancestors, by sending a delegation of theirs to Drama; its members participated in yesterday’s events in memory the 5,000 victims in the prefecture, which were massacred by the Fascist Bulgarian occupation army in autumn of 1941. This is a major event which has satisfied relatives and fellow-townspeople of those sacrificed."

May saw the beginning of detailed discussions on the common heritage of Bulgaria and Macedonia, which reached their peak in August with the statement of the Greek President that "In essence, this state has rejected its national identity. Because, if we want to be fair towards history, those who live today in the so-called Skopje state are not Macedonians. This is a name which they have obtained for reasons of policy and expediency since the epoch of the late Tito. In essence they are Bulgarians. They have reached the point of accepting the Bulgarians in 1941, with great ceremonies, with Bulgarian flags and uniforms. There is no Macedonian language. It is nothing more than a creation." (El. 31/8).

Macedonia and the Macedonians

The beginning of the period was characterized by cautious positive references to Macedonia, due to the fact that a Greek music concert took place in Skopje: "a concrete disapprobation of all the nationalistic hysteria which had led to the embargoes, the humiliating statements about ‘Skopjan gypsies’ and to the development of enmity and hatred towards a neighboring people; we ought to say, ‘Listen, friends, we’ve committed indescribable mistakes, it’s time to turn the page and taste the benefits, not of hostility and hatred, but of co-operation." (El. 20/4, quoting L. Kyrkos). However, many politicians and journalists expressed their fear that the name issue is hastily led to a closure against Greece’s interests, thus producing a feeling of endangerment and setting off an already tense atmosphere. "They argue, with the unbearable hypocrisy which characterizes them, that Mikis conquered Skopje. Wrong. M. Theodorakis gave a concert for the President of pseudo-Macedonia. He legitimized with his artistic authority pseudo-Macedonia, which in the Greek people’s comprehension is a non-existent story. That is the bitter truth." (E.T. 15/4). "A propagandistic scene was put on, with Athens trying to put forward the line of diplomatic surrender and Skopje arguing in favor of friendship among the peoples, regardless of the policies applied. When the well-staged exercises to impress ended, Mr. Gligorov repeated very officially his intransigent anti-Hellenic positions …We reached such a point of national decay that we feel ‘relieved’ or even vindicated because we entertained the elite of a state which finds itself at the edge of ethnic disintegration and economic collapse and which uses the claims against Greece as the smallest common denominator among the political forces and the various ethnic groups…" E.T.(17/5).

June marked the beginning of a rather difficult period for Macedonia where inter-ethnic conflicts were flared up by the "flag crisis." Suddenly the Greek press showed an acute interest in the relations between the different ethnic groups in the neighboring state. "And while the Slavo-Macedonian majority chooses respect with regard to personal rights as a recipe for the protection of the subjects of FYROM, the Albanians demand recognition of their collective rights within a federal or even a confederate system of government. It is evident that no common ground has been found between the Slavo-Macedonians and the Albanians in FYROM" (K. 21/9).

The "name issue" keeps resurfacing every now and then, while the media try to cultivate a climate of supremacy towards the neighboring state. "The implacable chauvinists in Skopje have understood the ‘trick’ well, namely, that Greece will never again accept them - even if geographically- as Macedonians and it will not recognize them no matter how much they ‘flop about’. What good is it to them even if they get recognized by the USA, if Greece does not accept them... Let alone the fact that they are neighboring with states (Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria) not simply hostile but which, moreover, have governments which will continuously be scheming against them (...) Therefore, there will be a sh... situation sooner or later there too!..." (A.T. 7/7); "Greece is the only significant country bordering with Skopje and it supports it in its development, and the only one which has no other problem with it beyond that which we are discussing in New York. That country will have to consider very seriously the outcome of these negotiations, namely, lest we reach the conclusion that it is not worth occupying oneself with Skopje and its population" (V. 31/8, statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs Th. Pangalos).

The traditional negative references are still present, though on a smaller scale: "the Skopjans attribute an ethnological content to the term Macedonia. Namely, they maintain that they belong to the nation of the …Macedonians. And this really constitutes a danger for security and peace in the region. Firstly, because ethnologically the Macedonians are Greeks. Second, because the Bulgarians consider the Skopjans as Bulgarians. And thirdly, because - apart from other minorities among which is the Greek minority- also Albanians live in Skopje. The arbitrary use of the terms ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedonians’ by the Skopjans, in complete distortion of history and reality, not only does not disengage things and situations but, on the contrary, it complicates them dangerously" (Ap. 15/9).

There are welcome exceptions which, although using the "traditional terminology", express a rather moderate approach. "The Skopjans are nice and polite. And they love us, as much as this may sound strange to the ears of some Greeks…They look up to Greece and the Greeks for help. They are afraid of the Bulgarians. They don’t have good relations at all with the Albanians, while the Turks have been excluded from the economic life. But you shouldn’t tell them anything about the name. In their discussions with the Greeks they avoid to pronounce the word ‘Macedonia’ in order not to offend them. They discuss politely and show that they have friendly feelings for our country…" (Eth. 15/5, quoting the Greek businessman Veropolous who opened a supermarket in Skopje).

A new trend of emphasizing the close political and historical relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia has been started. "However, see how the so-called ‘Macedonian people’ behaved, also according to the account of Vukmanovic Tempo, when the Bulgarian fascists entered Skopje in 1941: ‘They were greeted as liberators by the greater part of the population, even by certain ‘antifascist circles’." ("A Reply to Kiro Gligorov", S. Papathemelis, V. 6/7).

Around the end of the monitored period, some articles related to a Greek minority in Macedonia were published. "The former Minister of Macedonia-Thrace, G. Tjitjicostas, has recently informed public opinion that in accordance with data known to him, there are at least 200,000 Greeks in FYROM However, in the recent census carried out in the neighboring country, there is not so much as a mention that there are Greeks there. During the last fifty years, the Greek governments have never announced anything on the fate of the Greeks in Skopje" (Ap. 2/9).

Romania and the Romanians

Romania remains the least covered Balkan country. The scant articles which one can find present a contradictory picture. On the one hand "[the Romanians of the Rezita area] find themselves in such a dreadful economic situation that they sell their gold teeth to the National Bank in order to supplement to their monthly income." (E.T., 4/4). "They did not have money for a funeral and put 47 dead infants into formalin." (El.8/5). On the other hand, however, Romania is a "Balkan oasis" which "has developed into one of the best - if not the best- markets in the Balkans. This fact is attributed to the political stability, compared of course to the rest of the area, but primarily to the recent favorable amendment in the legislation on investments." (Ex. 7/7).

In August the "bad" past of the Greek-Romanian relations was called forth due to the recent events in Albania. "Crucial and ‘tormenting’ questions"; "We have accepted even Romanians as a military mission in Gjirokastra and Korce. We are hopeful that they will not consider the Vlach-speaking Greeks living there as their ancestors!" (A.T. 8/8)

Serbia and the Serbs

The change of attitude towards Serbian President Milsevic and his authoritarianism which was begun in the previous six months became stronger and more extensive. Thus "the new Milosevic beginning" (Ex. 24/7) was characterized as a vaulting-board for a new leading role by the former Serbian President. "The Serbs had reversed their international reputation as a nation of indignant nationalists and they seemed determined to create a better democratic future. Not any more. Suddenly, Milosevic was once again at the position of the driver..." (V. 3/8). "But this (Milosevic’s) ‘policy’ will be paid for by the next generations also, in the form of a permanent destabilization in the area, a return to anachronistic nationalist ideologies, to fascist views and to primitive hatred. This policy has led to the creation of a desert in the heart of Europe, to the blocking of democratization and of political and economic reforms. This ‘policy’ produced new unresolved contradictions, which lead to a new vicious circle of conflicts and bloodshed" (El. 26/8). "The Yugoslav President has absolute control over the game in Serbia" (Ex. 17/9)

Even though the Greek media seem determined to forget that they used to provide their ardent support for the Serbian regime, the presentation of the second edition of L. Hatziprodromdis book (B. 6/4) on the war in ex-Yugoslavia, "refreshed their memory" with a strong criticism on Greece’s stand in the previous years: "the Greek and foreign researchers who had informed us on time about the truths of the Yugoslavian tragedy [when, at the same time] most fellow-countrymen didn’t consider it their obligation to do whatever possible in order to re-establish a good peace in the inflamed Yugoslavia. On the contrary, they chose to revert into fanatic allies not to Serbia and the Serbians, but to the Milosevic regime, praising as well the Bosnian Serb leaders (creations of Karadjic and Mladic)."

The media analyze at length the relations between the Serbs and the Croats whenever there is a suitable occasion, be it in respect to the policies of the two states ["The authoritarian regimes of Tudjman and Milosevic can at any moment choose to go ahead, in other words, to light up new nationalist antagonisms as an ultimate solution to a new extenuation of their regimes’ life (…) hence constituting a serious threat to the fragile state of things as it has developed in the region after November 1995." (El. 24/6).] or just in relation to a lost football game, which is taken as "‘Serbian lamentation’, ‘The net of shame’, ‘Disaster’ were some of the headlines in Serbian newspapers with regard to the smashing 5-0 of Belgade’s ‘Partisan’ by Zagreb’s ‘Croatia’ in the Champions’ League. Serbia experiences a drama. A defeat, yes; it is included in soccer. Exclusion too. But not by the Croats" (Ap. 1/8).

With the peak of the holiday season, some problems in the Greek-Serbian relations created by the Schengen Treaty came to the forefront. "Our embassy in Belgrade invokes the Schengen Treaty, when it delays the visas of the Yugoslav tourists who want to come to our country. The same things are heard in Moscow, Sofia and Bucharest, when Slovenes, Croats and Skopjans come with minimal formalities. Could it be, Mr. Pangalos, that we make it difficult for our traditional friends or those to whom we send the largest exports? However, when all these discover neighboring Turkey - which fawns on them without asking for any visas- then it will be too late to bring them back" (E.T. 11/8).

On the occasion of the latest developments in Bosnia and G. Papandreou’s visit to Sarajevo some media "remembered" their unquestionable support for the "Serbian brothers" and produced certain anti-Muslim comments: "Last week, Muslim schools in Sarajevo were inaugurated by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, G. Papandreou, in an atmosphere of complete bliss. We are informed that the schools have been (re)constructed by Greek companies with a generous funding by the Simitis government, namely by the Greek tax-payers who, as usual, are not asked about that kind of choices. (…) Couldn’t he, however, even if in name only, inaugurate some school or hospital in the Serbian sector of Bosnia? It’s a shame to the sensitivity invoked by the mentioned Minister on humanistic issues. Or, could it be that the Serbs are not human beings according to the new status quo? However, one can draw their conclusions from the fact that the Greek Minister avoided meeting the Serbian representative of the collective Presidency." (E.T. 7/9).

Turkey and the Turks

As a rule, Turkey gets the most extensive (and predominantly negative) coverage. On every occasion, there is a comparison between the "bad" and "barbarian" Turkey in relation to the "democratic" and "culturally superior" Greece. "The good of democracy is unknown in our neighboring country in the sense that it is understood by us. Since 1923, the Turks have always been enjoying a democracy of the tanks or a democracy under the guardianship of the military" (Ap. 20/7). "Turkey may attempt to appear as a European country, the Americans and the Europeans may shut their eyes before Ankara’s extreme Islamist positions, on many occasions, however, they cannot shut their eyes before the Turkish brutalities." (A.T. 7/8).

There are many generalizations about the Turks, who "are these barbarians who still dare threaten us, insult us, while we here dance tsiftetelia and karsilamades [Oriental dances]? As you can guess, we are speaking about our bad neighbors - the Turks. (…) No matter how much the Turks are attacked today and what an inferiority complex they have because of their Mongol origin, there is nothing they can do to change things. (…) The uncivilized barbaric Turks can not become friends; once again our Western European partners will recur to the defenders of the borderlands (akrites) in order to take out the snake from the hole" (Ap. 1/6). "How come the Turks, all the Turks, are the same, without the slightest difference existing between the rulers and the ruled, the religious and the non-religious; all of them are uncivilized, stupid, fanatical Mohamaddans, fundamentalists, slayers of Greeks (ellinofagoi), blood-thirsty Orientals who have just come out of their caves and who have been incapable of developing any art, after so many centuries of history (…) Yes - the barbarians. Yes - the fundamentalists. They consider their cultural heritage, in other words, a constitutive element of their life and an aspect of their history, a building constructed by the hands of ‘faithless’, the hands of ‘time immemorial’ enemies." (K. 27/6). "The Turks …look desperately for their cultural identity and for tourists, and as a result they demonstrate all the more frequently that they are ignorant of history, imperialists and insolent." (A.T. 22/9).

Typical as to how the "barbarian image" of Turkey is perceived and accepted by the Greeks, is a text by P. Boukalas in K. (20). "Before we even began to be taught history, the state-made version of history anyway, before we even decided as Olympiakos fans that our eternal enemy is Panathinaikos fans (and vice-versa) we have been seized by the unshakable conviction that our eternal national enemy is the Turks, despite the fact that much more often we used to hear about the - fresh as yet - evils inflicted by the Germans and the Italians."

The Turkish state, on the other hand, is presented as one which does not respect human rights ["How many heads did they cut off in 1997? There’s a good question. How many young Kurds did they kill in cold blood? How many Kurd women did they rape?" (Ad.T. 12/5)] and which lacks fundamental democratic characteristics. "Turkey is a country which is very far from being called a ‘state of law’ …a state which does not remind us of the Ottoman Empire but still dreams of it. A state which does not even deserve to be classified as underdeveloped" (El. 28/5). "Yesterday, showing its extremely anti-democratic face once more, Turkey proceeded to deport foreigners who ‘dared’ touch upon the Kurdish issue publicly and, at the same time, it escalated the battle to deal with the ‘Islamic threat’ with arrests of demonstrators who were protesting against the attempted abolition of the religious schools" (K. 6/9). "‘It is impossible to discuss with the bandit, the killer and the rapist’, said the Greek Minister referring to ‘that section of the military and diplomatic Establishment’ in Turkey which disputes the Greek borders in the Aegean Sea, Th. Pangalos stated" (El. 25/9).

Starting in August, the Greek papers adopted a new approach in treating Turkey. Apart from the usual pictures of "barbarianism", now they draw parallels between the political leadership in Turkey and Hitler’s regime. "Turkey functions like Hitler in the 1930s towards Central and Eastern Europe, with a structural expansionism, and an appeasing way of dealing with it strengthens this aggressiveness" (El. 24/8). "Nazism - Kemalism, similarities in foreign policy": "This policy, the policy of national cleansing and expansion which had been followed in the pre-war years by Hitler’s Germany, is at present followed by Turkey in our region with the consent and backing of the western press and the tolerance of the western governments. The Turkish expansionist policy, however, will harm first of all the Westerners, as was the case also with Hitler’s Germany." (Ap. 29/9)

In this light the perspective of Turkey’s admission into the European Union is a standing subject of projection and discussion in the Greek press. "We are a nation which is slowly dying. And if we continue in this pace, in fifty years we will be a species under extinction. Whereas, Turkey has a population explosion. And it will need no war in order to re-occupy the whole of Greece. Because, simply, the perspective of its admission into the European Union exists. Which means the right to free settlement for millions of Turks in the European region which will be called ‘Greece’, but only in the geographical meaning of the word. Not any more in the ethnological meaning. (…) If the Turkish political leadership did not have so many internal problems to consider necessary for it to preserve a Greek-Turkish tension for internal consumption, Turkey would neither threaten nor provoke Greece. On the contrary, it would do everything in its power in order to persuade that it is eligible to be included in the next phase or even in the phase after the next, in the European enlargement. And to exploit the advantage of free movement and settlement. In order to also swallow, in the most painless as well as a safe manner, Thrace and our islands and Greece as a whole" (A.T. 13/9). "We cannot accept a free movement - as it will inevitably be the case - of Asiatic and semi-barbarian populations, even if it is in the form of cheap workforce from Anatolia to the Greek islands and also to the Greek hinterland, something which will result in a gradual change of the native population to the extent that the other peoples will be informed about Greece from school or from historical books" (A.T. 15).

Apart from these general trends, the coverage of three particular events provoked contradictory reactions in the Greek media. The first one was Foreign Minister Pangalos’ repeated statement that "I am on the alert when one practices politics on the basis of religion... That is why I don’t understand those who think that Europe ends somewhere between Zagreb and Belgrade... And here, in the Balkans, exists a Europe which it is not permitted to abandon. (...) Islam is not a foreign body to Europe, but a known component of its cultural physiognomy. Islam belongs to the future of Europe, a future which will be shared with the Moslems…" (El. 5/4). The conservative Greek papers were especially vocal in their condemnation of the above position: "The origin of the Turks is clearly Asian. Their remoter ancestors seem to have been the horrible Huns, whose invasions destroyed Asia and Europe, so much that their name rests in history as a symbol of abysmal barbarism and disaster... Concerning ‘the crowning’ [statement] of our Minister, we will not even comment on the assimilation of the two countries, of which one stood as the infinite source (‘paga laleousa’) of a splendid civilization and the teacher of Europe, while the other was throughout time and throughout the continents a slaughterer, a vandal, Irostratos" (B. 6/4).

Second came the concert of a Greek and a Turk in Cyprus which triggered many negative stories. "The musical solution [sic] is not always a panacea…There used to be music in German concentration camps when they were executing women and children" (Ad.T. 17/5); "The only answer should be contempt and it is sufficient for this annoying, dull, ridiculous, but also provocative action, amidst the ignorance of apolitical constructs of the ‘star-system’" (Ad.T. 17/5). Nevertheless, there were also some positive comments on citizens’ initiatives to further peace and cooperation between the two countries. "However, I admit that I don’t understand all this noise about the concert that he will be giving in Cyprus, in the neutral zone, together with his Turkish colleague. I don’t understand why it is nationally inadmissible, disloyal and dangerous, and I don’t know what else, for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to meet and sing together whatever they want … How do we talk about and how do we demand the union of Cyprus in one independent state when we refuse what is fundamental - the coexistence in a manifestation? Are we then to believe that a concert undermines the national front? Or that the condition for its realization should have been the condemnation of Turkish barbarism?" (El. 17/5)

And last, but not least comes the July signing of the Madrid Agreement between Greece and Turkey. While the pro-government press openly greeted it, the pro-opposition papers showed their profound dissatisfaction. "The Madrid Agreement does not serve the Greek interests, and, with this paper, Greece will soon find itself before some reefs... Turkey’s ulterior purpose is the conquest of an island or islands in the Eastern Aegean Sea" (general D. Skarvelis, E.T. 20/7).

O?oeio

-

Profile Home Page Links Communication