November 1997 Monitoring.

by Christina Rougheri, Greek Helsinki Monitor and Minority Rights Group - Gr.

ABSTRACT

The pan-Balkan meeting in Crete: different responses and mixed feelings. Creation of the impression of cooling down of the relations between Pomaks and Turks in Thrace. Commemoration of the Jews of Thessaloniki - spotlight in the press, the backstage of the show. Albania and Serbia: Satisfaction about their first positive rapprochement in 50 years. Macedonia’s coverage is related to the "name issue." Rumania: Disappointment with the picture presented in Crete. Turkey-Greece: The message that it is transmitted is that Greeks are the good guys and Turks the bad guys.

Internal Minorities

The subject of the pan-Balkan conference in Crete monopolized the interest of the Greek people, with opinions voiced about the motives, the objectives and the future of this initiative. These opinions differed depending on the political orientation of the newspapers. In general, the pro-government press supported the whole effort even when on several occasions they expressed their dissatisfaction with the political results on . The mere fact that it had taken place, and the symbolic nature of the whole operation were judged as particularly important for the creation of a positive climate among the Balkan countries. On the other hand, the opposition press was more reserved, charging that the government was toeing the line of foreign decision-makers. In spite of the fact that A.T. is a conservative newspaper, at some point, one of its’ journalists admits that the governmental initiative was not bad at all, claiming the following: "The mere fact that the pan-Balkan cooperation has been set up in Greece, and mostly as a result of a Greek initiative, is surely a positive factor which supports the country’s role in the area."

Many champions of a more realistic foreign policy pointed to the possible danger for Greece to be taken as the "sovereign" of the conference. That is why they tried to avoid any trace of superiority, unlike some journalist who referred to "Balkan third-world neighbors". "The objective assessment of Greece’s ‘preferential status’ cannot be contiguous with the leader’s role in the area. Mr. Simitis correctly raised this issue, in order to clarify it. Any attempts for domination in southeastern Europe would only result in subverting the whole process of regional cooperation which seems to be getting stronger after many trials." (N. 7/11).

With regard to the erection of a monument in commemoration of the Jews of Thessaloniki, who died in the Holocaust, Ex. (22/11) noted: "The monument… in Thessaloniki which came into being a bit too late." The newspaper stresses the fact that this gesture is belated and comments on Greece’s policy on minorities during the past 50 years. "In modern Greece the idea of minorities rings a negative, even if not actually hostile, note in the ears of the Greek citizens. It is odd that while Greece is the most solid state in the Balkans, it continues to be afraid of its minorities, which all together don’t add up to more than 200,000 people."

Even though the above mentioned number has nothing to do with the real one , such an opinion reflects the "ostrich-like" way in which Greece approaches these issues. However, no newspaper had the courage to criticize, or even to bring up the anti-Semitic incidents which are from time to time reported in the press. Following are a few examples of such incidents: the question tabled in parliament by a New Democracy MP about the family background (Jewish) of the ex-minister for Foreign Affairs, C. Rozakis, as well as the vandalizing of the Jewish cemetery in Trikala. On top of all this was the necessity for posting of guards at the Jewish monument, after threats for its destruction received by the president of the Jewish community.

Following the visit to Thrace of the opposition’s leader, Mr. K. Karamanlis, Eth. (29/11) referred to the "hard-core minorities." This was provoked by the demands which the president of the community, Moulas Neznel, had voiced. These included: "more religious freedom, the right to elect their own mufti … the ratification in practice of the Treaty of Lausanne with reference to minorities getting books in their own languages, etc." . The distinction in between the hard core of the minority and all others minority citizens is also used for political reasons, more or less as a perfect alibi to connect the demands of the minority with the Turkish imperialism rather than the International Law. It was interesting that neither the papers supporting the government, nor the opposition ones commented on the above opinion, something which certainly would not have happened had it been for a statement by the Prime Minister. The fact that the minority in Thrace has been used politically both at home and abroad has been proved again and again. Keeping in mind all this, it is easy to see why a pro-governmental newspaper (Eth) would treat the whole situation of the minority negatively, especially as regards its ongoing demands for real equality and legal rights. AP. (29/11) did not comment on these demands. The same policy was followed by the other opposition papers - E.T. and A.T. - on the same day. However, the Sunday editions of both papers "forgot about" the demands, focusing on other "less dangerous" matters which were not so damaging to the opposition party’s image.

The papers have recently "discovered" the Greek Pomaks. Thus they started supporting openly the initiatives for the publication of the first Pomak dictionary and of the first Pomak-language newspaper, as well as for the recording of Pomak stories and traditional songs. However, this support is not always based on the highest humanitarian motives. The real interests came to the fore much later, when a part of the press openly created the impression of cooling down of the relations between the Pomak and the Turkish community. The latter was presented as reacting negatively, almost provocatively, towards these initiatives. The differentiation between the two communities is usually just stated, but on other occasions it is the aim of the newspapers: "Animosity from the Turkish-language press towards a Pomak writer" (EL. 21/11). "First reactions, both positive and negative, after the publication of the Pomak-language ‘Zagalisa.’ The editor-in-chief of the newspaper told us ‘I see it as a positive step towards the building of a feeling of identity…’ On the other hand the Synaspimos MP, Mr. Mustafa, disagreed: ‘I think this is done within theoverall scheme for pacifying the minorities in a subversive way… we have the phenomenon of getting expressions of love for the Pomak language, and for the Gypsies from people who advocate the expulsion of minorities.’ The third opinion was of the president of the unofficial Higher Minority Council, A. Bekiroglou: ‘It is an effort which doesn’t interest the people, it doesn’t concern anyone.’"(EL. 2/11) In very few cases was there any criticism of the ulterior motives behind the support for these initiatives.

The minorities’ real problems were unearthed by chance in a research published by Eth (25/11). In an attempt to find out the percentage of literacy in Greece by county, the paper shows (even though in this particular report there is no explicit mention of this) that the biggest problem is faced by the prefecture of Thrace. The latter is inhabited by Pomaks, Turks and Roma. The research inadvertently shows the serious educational problems faced by these minorities. In Xanthi those who do not finish the obligatory nine-year educational course are 73% of the population, with the percentage of graduates not more that 3.5%. Similar percentages are reported for Evro: 67.1% and 4.3% respectively, and for Rodopi - 78.2% and 3.5% respectively. At the same time EL. (21/11) refers to the announcement of a two-year educational program for minorities. This program is supposed to include, among other things, carrying out of research and visits to minority schools. The paper notes that "Dissenting voices are not missing" from the discussion of the proposal to "promote the teaching in Turkish as the main language." This is automatically "translated" as marginalization, and the suppression of "‘Greek to an inferior position.’"

The following abstracts show the distrust with which the Turkish minority is met. The fact that the Greek government looks for dividends when treating this subject was hushed up as usual: "The general Turkish Consul in Komotini spreads out hostile propaganda,… controls and terrorizes the Muslim minority with Turkish spies in every large village. These spies assimilate the recently-arrived Muslims of different races into the "Great Turkish nation. The muftis are also involved. They try to create the feeling among the Muslims that Greece wants nothing else but to get rid of them, while ‘Mother Turkey opposes to that’…"(A.T. 25/11).

More objective views like the following are the exception to the rule: "We say, for example, that Greece is not expansionist. However, this year we celebrate the 50^th anniversary of the reunion with the Dodecanese. Was that expansionism on Turkey’s part? The catchword ‘union with Cyprus’ is, to us, a call for national completion. But isn’t this expansionism from Turkey’s standpoint?…" (B. 30/11)

Writing about the initiative of the Greek National Radio to broadcast programs in Turkish, EL. (27/11) stresses that "It is a brave initiative of the Director General of the Greek National Radio. This shows that our country respects and implements in practice the agreements within the Framework Convention on the Protection of Minorities of the Council of Europe."; "It is sure that in this case some overheated patriots will condemn and slander this historic initiative. These would be the ones who have held up the bars behind which the Greek Pomaks lived for decades, so that the Pomaks needed passports to move around their own country. We saw what the result was. These people were embraced wholeheartedly by the Turkish Consulate. These overheated patriots were the ones who upheld the inadmissible case of the bilingual Greeks of Macedonia and Eastern Thrace, stopped the latters’ festivals and even forbade their local songs and dances, making these minority people feel (without any reason) inferior. Ignore the overheated patriots!".

Following the strong reactions of the minority MP M. Mustafa in parliament against the "Capodistria" plan and against the possible administrative unification of councils and communities, K. (9/11) expressed its cautious sympathy with the MP’s criticisms when he said that the whole plan was inspired by "the perception of creating mixed community councils.". In particular, the newspaper pointed out that "if the criticisms are true, it means that the hot-headed (and leaderless) patriots have decided to surrender their new councils to the Turkish Consulate."

As regards Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code (for which Greece has been criticized by the Council of Europe and by hosts of human rights organizations and committees), the government seems to be divided on whether to amend it or to abolish it altogether. Bishop Maronias, for the umpteenth time, expressed his objections to the abolition of the article. He said to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, T. Pangalos, that "(…) his basic concern for the defense of the Greek state in these critical moments makes him insist that not only Article 19 be upheld, but that the decree goes further and removes the Greek citizenship off any Greek citizen living in Thrace, who acts secretly against the country." (E.T. 1/12)

On the subject of the Macedonian minority, EL. (28/11), referring to the delegation of Nova Makedonia journalists to Greece, speaks about "A new impropriety by Skopje. It has sent a group of journalists who wandered around the whole of northern Greece in a propagandist - as it turned out - campaign. The latter was aimed at bringing the Macedonian minority issue back into the limelight." " the state radio in Skopje continues to broadcast an openly propagandist program in Greek - just like the Bulgarians, the Serbs and the Albanians do - aimed at the ‘Macedonian’ minorities living in the neighboring countries."

The editor does not analyze the definition of "propagandist," nor does he give any real information about the content of the supplement "Nova Makedonia". Moreover, while dealing with the radio program, he persistently avoids naming his sources or, at least, giving some indirect facts. All this results in the reproduction of the already familiar xenophobic effect, aimed at attracting the attention of the readers and gain the battle of impressions, based on the usual stereotyping and the syndromes of national enemies/neighbors.

The connection between the foreign immigrants in Greece and the increase in crime is recycled again and again. The statements by the Administrator of Attica Security, Mr. Papfili, are very typical of this: "What we see, however, is that most crimes are committed by foreigners. The ‘pure’ Greek crimes are going down in number , while those done by foreigners are going up." (AP. 2/11); "According to the police statistics, it is clear that during the first six months of 1997 the increase in crime is caused by foreigners, mostly by Albanians." (N. 1/12)

From time to time the familiar negative stereotypes about conscientious objectors resurface in the newspapers: "…The establishment of the so-called ‘alternative national service’ for conscientious objectors means that the ones who are responsible for that do not understand that these gentlemen have no place in a country which is permanently under the threat of destruction." (A.T. 19/11)

Albania and the Albanians

Albania did not attract much the attention of the Greek newspapers during this month. The relations between the two countries are generally considered to be on the right track, in a better shape, and more open than ever. There were some markedly positive comments about the contact between the Albanian Prime Minister, F. Nano, and the Serbian President, S. Milosevic, within the framework of the Cretan Meeting: "After 50 years, the ice between Tirana and Belgrade has melted." (K. 4/11).

Bulgaria and the Bulgarians

Ex (21/11) noted with satisfaction that "10% of the investment in Bulgaria comes from Greeks."

Macedonia and the Macedonians

Even though the name issue has attracted less attention lately, it is still seen as the main obstacle in the relations between the two countries, which frequently provokes a significant portion of the press to write negative articles. Lately, the impression that both countries claim to be having national minorities on the territory of the other one’s, is more and more cultivated in the Greek press. Still, from the Greek part, this is not an official governmental statement, rather than the position of some journalists and politicians of the conservative and even fascist side. These people use the alleged Greek minority as a counterweight to the demands from the Macedonian part about the Macedonian minority in Greece. "Unbelievable! Even Gligorov, dilapidated Gligorov, as he appeared in Crete, came here on Greek soil and threatened to start a war unless Greece accepts the name of Macedonia for Skopje (…) we have still to see whose turn it is to threaten us next, which Balkan or third-world country." (AP. 7/11) "The artificial state of Skopje not only challenges the historical reality and truth but also terrorizes the defenseless Greeks who live in the area" (El. 2/11/97, statement by S. Anastasakos, PASOK deputy).

"The only way out for the Skopje leadership is to upgrade the ideology of pseudo-Macedonianism. This is the only product which works for the unification of the nation’s groups there… Some sources say that Skopje has already begun talking freely about a ‘Macedonian minority’ in Greece. However, in order not to be condemned for the violation of the Interim Agreement of 1995, they use the shop-window of some putative NGOs which traffic in the well-known propaganda about the ‘Macedonians of the Aegean.’" (E.T.23/11)

There are also the extreme positions of those who would have liked a different settlement to the problems between Athens and Skopje: "Instead of them [the USA] saying, ‘we dissolved Yugoslavia, so you can take the Greek piece which belongs to you.’" (A.T. 12/11)

However, there are also some opposing views, which take a more realistic approach and recognize the part played by political intolerance and nationalistic hysteria in the past: "Who cares whether Gligorov succeeds in getting his country internationally recognized? The only thing which matters is that we don’t recognize its name… This logic makes it impossible for the international community to understand the weakness for which we have paid dearly in the case of Skopje. Better to recognize the real reason which has led us to the dead end. We should avoid trapping ourselves into our own isolationist idealism…" (EL. 24/11).

Rumania and the Rumanians

"To everybody’s surprise, the Rumanian representative provoked the strongest reactions of all. At the outset of the meeting he refused to sign even a joint bulletin. This resulted in the fact that there would be a special angry meeting between T. Pangalos and the Rumanian Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs." (EL. 5/11) The above comments reflect in a very telling way the surprise and bitterness of the Greek press provoked by the position of the Rumanian representative at the pan-Balkan talks.

Serbia and the Serbs

There was little coverage of the Serbs this month. It was predominantly centered on the talks between Nano and Milosevic in Crete.

Turkey and the Turks

The meeting of the Greek Prime Minister, K. Simitis, and his Turkish counterpart, M. Yelmaz, within the framework of the pan-Balkan conference in Crete monopolized the interest of the press this month. In this case, the prism through which the facts were viewed depended on the political bias of the newspaper. The pro-government press greeted the effort, seeing it at least as a first step towards the improvement of the political climate after the failure of the New York talks at the level of Foreign Ministers: "(…) the meeting between Simitis and Yelmaz seemed to carry a much greater importance than ever before and than was publicly attributed to it." (Ex 5/11). On the other hand, the opposition press dealt with the whole issue with skepticism and distrust, criticizing the government for a compliant foreign policy, which simply follows the orders of the US and the other protectors of Turkey. The Turkish Prime Minister was presented negatively, simply as a mouthpiece of the military establishment in his country, which is tied up in internal problems and in its identity conflicts: "It was a political shipwreck. They simply agreed to disagree, but in a civilized way. That is to say exactly what we had foreseen." (E.T. 4/12) "The Turkish generals sent their subordinate and eager little politician to Crete, filling his pockets with notes on what he had to say, especially in his meeting with Mr. Simitis… At the same time they acted disrespectfully with their irrational display of strength, which was extremely insulting to the prestige of the pan-Balkan talks, by sending in airplanes with the idea of showing to all Balkan representatives that weapons, and particularly Turkish weapons, are the decisive factors in the whole area!" (Eth. 4/12).

The way in which Turkey deals with the question of human rights, and the stance which it takes in regard to its minorities, were of particular interest to the Greek press. This was done not so much due to some humanitarian principles, but in order to condemn the undemocratic and barbaric face of the neighboring country: "On Sunday Turkey will carry out a formal census. The Turkish government presents the fact that neither the religious beliefs nor the nationality of its citizens will be registered, because both are ‘democratic choices.’ However, the real reason is quite different. It lies in the fact that Turkey wants everybody to be a Turk… This goes even for the Kurds, the few remaining Greeks, the Armenians, and the Jews… We want to … separate our citizens, even if they have the honor to stubbornly retain their Greekness in the face of difficult moments." (A.T. 25/11)

The conflicts with Greece, either direct or indirect, strengthen the already negative image. Oftentimes the situation is presented one-sidedly, in an almost ostrich-like fashion. The report of the International Helsinki Federation was shown in such a way that the reader gets the impression that it concerns only Turkey and no other country, not even Greece itself.

When, however, the question of respect for human rights in Turkey is raised by groups from abroad (politicians, journalists, etc.) the press reproduces the negative comments about Turkey, increasing its own prejudiced stance as regards the neighboring country. All this re-enforces the existing stereotypes: "Turkey, a country which has been drinking the blood of other nations and races for 700 years, is among the international outlaws , which should disappear from the global map." Report by the Forum Study of the UNHCR, George Thomas Courian, (E.T. 14/11)]. "The newspapers Het Parool and VCR Hendelsblad say in their articles that the Turkish government and police have two modes of action. They set free members of gangs, while arresting left-wing activists ." (A.T. 5/11). "Yelmaz stated that human rights have improved in his country, but the Council of Europe Committee Against Torture attacked Turkey yesterday for violations of human rights. Yesterday, however, the president of the Afion criminal court, who has been trying 11 policemen for torture, resigned, claiming to have got pressure from different sides, something which did not allow him to handle the case properly." (EL. 7/11).

Even the question of the commitment to trial of the ex-Prime Minister, N. Erbacan, is seen by the Greek press as an example of the lack of tolerance, liberty of speech and, consequently, of democracy in the country: "Turkey is not, however, a democratic country. And the imminent trial of the so-called Constitutional Court on the banning of the Evhymerias party, is nothing other than a dictatorial farce." (K. 19/11) "In the long-lasting military coup, which Turkey insists on calling democratic and the West accepts this, the new chapter of bigotry was started yesterday. The country’s Constitutional Court began discussions on the application of the General Prosecutor to declare the ex-Prime Minister’s Islamic party illegal." (K. 11/11).

Apart from the subject of human rights, the country’s identity problems are particularly stressed. This is related to the weakness of the political establishment to function within the framework of a "real" and not just a so-called "democracy." This picture legitimizes in the eyes of the Greek public not only the justification for the refusal of dialogue, but also the cultivation of a superiority complex over the aggressive and heretic neighboring country. "To put it more clearly, there are no margins for a real dialogue with Turkey as long as that country continues to exist among the Islam and the military maintenance of ‘Kemalism’, as well as its leanings towards Europe. In spite of what the Islamists’ position would be, the military status quo is European only in papers. Unless one dreams of a present day or a future leader who would be willing to reject the power he holds and change into a western style chief of staff, who would stand proudly in front of the Defense Minister, rather than asking the latter to tell him the right decisions." (Eth. 5/11) "…two implacable camps which make Ankara march the "labyrinth" road of internal conflict and jump between the west and the east in the struggle between the military and the civil establishment, between democracy and dictatorship, between Islam and the social state, between regress and progress, between state-owned economy and the free market, between intolerance and acceptance, even though its foreign policy is governed on the basis of Turkish nationalism." (EL. 2/11).

Keeping in mind all the above, it is easy to explain the way in which the Greeks construct their images and opinions about the Turks. "Maybe because a large group of the Turks are chauvinist and anti-Greek? Of course not. They are simply more cunning, because they understand that Turkey is getting stronger and thus more threatening now that it has allies in the West (…) What importance does it have, therefore, if among the tens of millions of Turks there are at least one million who are really internationalists? Where were they when angry Turkish crowds terrorized the Greeks and looted their property? Where are they now?" [M. Kaskani, a high school student (K 25/11)]. The responsibility for the continuous presence of negative stereotypes in the Greek press is often shared between many journalists, academics, artists, politicians, and other opinion-makers, who, often impose their prejudices about Turkey upon the readers. "Genocide is practiced even today. In fact, this is done very close to Greece, while the civilized world pretends that it doesn’t hear and can’t see anything wrong. Silence often means complicity." [T. Pangalos ET (24/11)]. "Turkey is an Asiatic power which doesn’t respect international laws, which acts aggressively against its neighbors. The military and an undemocratic establishment rule there and oppress the numerous Kurdish minority." (E.T. 20/11) Under this perspective, one can easily explain why "the conservative majority of Greeks (80%) is opposed to the imminent entry of Turkey into the European Union, while only one Greek in ten supports that possibility." (E.T. 28/11)

Still, in spite of the fact that the negative stereotypes about Turks and Turkey are dominant in the Greek press, the few exceptions, presenting the other side of the moon, make their present more evident and more often than ever before, in the Greek press. The following abstract concerning the meeting of Greek and Turkish businessmen in Salonica can be a characteristic example. "…the problem isn’t that 200-300 fascists rushed to beat the Greeks and the Turks who took part in the ‘Venizelos-Ataturk’ demonstration in Thessaloniki. They were doing their job. The problem is that the authorities didn’t do their job, and were not able to protect the participants in the rally. The problem is that the climate for these incidents has been prepared by Bishop Pandeleimon, by MP Papahemelis, and by the Mayor, Kosmopoulos, when they openly condemned the holding of the meeting in Thessaloniki"; "The problem is that Mr. Koots, who was among those attacked by the ‘patriots,’ had expressed, openly, his grief and disappointment when the incidents against the Patriarch took place in Trapezounda, by claiming, at that time, that he was ashamed to be a Turk’, when from the Greek part, nobody said something similar. (V. 2/11). Still, even though the incidents in Thessaloniki were openly condemned by the Greek press in its majority, the skepticism and possible dislike for the fact that such meetings had taken place are impossible to hide: “they are dangerously ignoring history, those ‘progressive’ Greek businessmen, who anticipate certain gains from their friendship with their naive (are they only naïve or more than that?) profit-making Greek-Turkish business called ‘Venizelos-Kemal.’ After all, we can be sure that, in the best of times, Kemal openly ‘robbed’ his Greek partner, at least as regards Greek Thrace." (A.T. 27/11).