ABSTRACT

* Continuation of the issue on the Turks of Thrace Advisory Committee, one of the dimensions of the right of the minority to self-determination which is not recognized by the Greek state. * Educational issues. * Restraints regarding religious freedom. * Albanophobia and Albanian-slaying mood; Albanian migrants are scapegoats of racist behavior by the media and by certain local government bodies. * Albania, Bulgaria, Romania - scant references mostly on economic issues. * Macedonia and political dimensions of the name issue. * Serbia and Kosovo - superficial neutrality, rather pro-Serb in its essence. * Turkey, the personification of what is bad and barbarous.

Internal Minorities

The first glance at the Athenian press shows a significant change in relation to the past and also to the nationally sensitive issue of the minority in Thrace. Past mistakes in the political handling of the issue are pointed out with increasing courage, not only vis-a-vis Turkey and the international community but also vis-a-vis the minority itself. However, at a second level of reading, this demonstration of courage not only is exhausted in unessential aspects of the issue, but also obstructs the correct approach to all these parameters, which are considered essential for the substance and respect of minority rights according to international standards. These rights include the right to self-determination, to elected religious leaders, to political representation, to educational freedom. An unsuspecting reader will form the impression that, in fact, there was some wrong handling (which moreover is a thing of the past), not realizing that more has yet to be done in order to safeguard fully the rights of the minority. Whenever the minority demands lawful rights which are denied to it by the Greek State, the reactions of the press leave no margins for misinterpretations: the minority demands just for the sake of presenting demands and not because there are serious reasons to justify such a thing. Incited by Turkey, the minority exists only in order to cause problems to Greece’s international image, in offering an alibi to the blatant trampling down on the Greek minority (and not only on that minority) in Turkey, in disorientating international public opinion. Apart from this, the Greek attitude vis-a-vis the minority appears to be impeccable. "The report of the ‘Human Rights Committee’ of the Turkish parliament regarding the Muslim minority in Western Thrace should be described at least as impertinent". (…) "Many years have gone by since certain bureaucratic difficulties were put aside – and these never had the character of prohibitions - which in effect delayed the acquisition of real property by some members of the Muslim minority". (…) "In essence, that which obviously annoyed the ‘advocates of Human Rights’ from Turkey is the assistance (even though belated) by the Greek state to the various components of the Muslim minority, so that they can develop the particular cultural or ethnological elements of their identity. The assistance regarding the culture e.g. of the Pomak language or the Roma language of the Gypsies, clearly makes difficult Ankara’s efforts to appropriate politically the whole of the Greek Muslims by characterizing them, collectively and with a complete distortion of reality, as ‘Turks’. Being used to the long inertia shown by Athens on this issue, the Turks resent the loss of their propaganda advantage" [Editorial, (K. 5/3)]. "The Turkish propaganda (misinformation) against Greece never stops. According to articles in Turkish newspapers (e.g. Cumhuriyet), a documentary regarding the minority in Western Thrace was filmed with state funds. In it, unfounded claims regarding ‘repression’ and ‘violation of human rights’ by the Greek State are expressed. However, through their connections and the huge amounts spent for their propaganda internationally, the neighbors have succeeded in having the documentary shown on many European -but not only European- channels and at film festivals" (E.T. 4/3). The exceptions are particularly scant, as a rule coming from specific reporters belonging to the progressive camp: "We owe the second proof regarding the segregation of the Greeks into authentic and illegitimate to the Ministry of Education. According to a circular, which raised the anger of the Muslim Members of Parliament, as yesterday’s ‘El.’ informed us, the children of the Muslim minority do not have the right to choose to attend several schools. If the institutional exclusions from Theology and Pastoral Theology sound reasonable (without necessarily being so), their exclusion from the Police and Fire-Brigade Academies reveals that we do not consider them as equals and as our own people. As regards the prohibition to study at the Schools of Tourism in Rhodes and Crete, I suppose that here too the trick about ‘the sensitive borderland regions’ is introduced with a legalizing purpose. And whom do we want to allegedly protect the regions from? But from the Greek citizens whom, very simply, we do not consider to be very much Greeks" (P. Boukalas, K. (5/3)].

The majority of the Greek media ignores the minority’s inalienable right to self-determination. Human rights are seen as something secondary in comparison to the complex-like Greek phobia, which connects the existence of minorities with the obligatory destabilization of the country and the adulteration of national (ethnological, linguistic and religious) cohesion. As a rule, the multi-cultural approach to the ‘other’, the ‘different’, and the beauty of difference are praised outside the borders of the Greek State. "Full political coverage is offered by the two major parties of the country to their Muslim Members of Parliament who, not only declare openly that they are ‘Turks’, but also are the official heads of the principal organ of the Ankara propaganda in the sensitive region of Thrace. The event acquires a particular political weight now that the leaderships of PASOK and New Democracy have proceeded with expulsions of MPs. They use various reasons for that, but they insist on keeping in their ranks the Muslims who not only violate the founding principles of the parties but the Greek Constitution as well" (E.T. 4/3). "If it were possible to connect Thrace with Hellenism! Where are the Greeks? It is not Greece there. It is …Thrakistan. That’s why we hail the supra-party troupe which was set up by three Turks, in accordance with their declaration, who are members of the Greek Parliament and are paid remuneration from the Greek coffer. These deserving fathers of the Nation have raised the banner of Turkism within Parliament as well. They deserve their pay wherever it comes from. By tomorrow - God willing - the Speaker of the Greek Parliament should hang up at the gallery, together with the Greek flag, the Turkish and the Skopjan flags too… What the heck! We are a multi-spectral state… (…) Tomorrow, the day after tomorrow… The volcano of Kosovo will erupt. Its lava will come down to our own territories. And then we will see the outbreak of a separatist movement in the Greek and in the Bulgarian part Thrace. Already the three Members of Parliament are at the vanguard there." [S. Kargakos, (E.T. 5/3)].

Very little essential discussion on the educational issues of the minority takes place as well. El. (4/3) quotes, without any further comments, the following piece of news: "The three Muslim MP from Thrace are ready to submit a question or a report because, as they maintain, Muslim children are not allowed to submit any supporting documents for certain schools (Theology, Social Theology in the University of Athens, Thessaloniki, departments of the University of Cyprus, Military Schools, Schools of the Police or Fire-Brigade Academy and Schools of Tourism of Rhodes and Aghios Nicolaos in Crete). And all this is despite the ministerial decision allowing Muslim pupils to enter at a quota of 0.5% of the overall number of those to be admitted". It is worth noting that El. is the only newspaper, which on that day mentioned the relevant news and the only one which, two days later, commented negatively on the shutting down of a minority station in Thrace. "Proceedings against the ‘ISIK FM’ minority radio station in Thrace, owned by the journalist Abdulhalim Dede, have been instituted by the Rhodopes Public Prosecutor. The charges are that ‘he has installed and started operating a radio station without getting the required license’. Why are the remaining unlicensed radio stations of Thrace not prosecuted in the same manner?"

Among the essential problems of the Turkish minority which superficially and occasionally concern the Athens press are also the restrictions laid against the erection of mosques (and places of worship in general) by the Greek Orthodox Church and by a section of the political world. "A mosque in Athens should have been established a long time ago, if there were no fear of the (overestimated) extreme right-wingers, but also of the many more (and this is the truth) nationalists throughout the political spectrum" (N. 5/3).

The restrictions on religious freedom do not pertain only to the minority in Thrace (where there should not be such problems, since the minority is recognized on the basis of a religious and not ethnic differentiation) but to a broader spectrum ranging from Jehovah’s Witnesses to Catholics. "The Ministry of Education legalizes in essence the sect of the millenarians. Moreover, for the first time it declared their views to be a dogma. Mr. Yiakoumatos denounces this hasty and unacceptable recognition because of the following facts. a) In these difficult years, such things poison children’s souls with views, which weaken the national consciousness (e.g. objection to military service) and strengthen the movement of those who express it. b) It undermines the principles and the entity of the official and constitutionally protected religious dogma of Orthodoxy, which is historically identified with our nation. c) In the future it can be used as a pretext for legalizing many other sects, para-religious organizations and ‘philosophical organizations with various activities’ as dogmas" (E.T. 11/3). A. Karkayiannis, editor (for many years) and editor-in-chief (at times) of many Athens newspapers, touches upon the issue of the Catholic communities on the Cycladic Islands and then presents the intense reaction of the official church personalities in the Orthodox Church. In his article, the aforementioned editor refers to the Catholic communities in Syra and Tenos maintaining that they act and exist, for years, lost in the illusion of a religiously uniform Greece, where Orthodoxy is synonymous to Hellenism, ignored by the majority of citizens and the media. And, in the context of a minimal recognition of the contribution made by these communities, he proposes to the Pope to make an official visit with the support of the Orthodox Church. The controversial article (5/3) provokes very few positive reactions ["It is true that 97% of the inhabitants of our country are Christian Orthodox; this, however, does not mean that Greeks are only those who are Christians and particularly Orthodox". (a letter by reader Mr. Lagouros, K (10/3))]. The official positions of the Metropolite of Syra and Tenos, Dorotheos, and the Metropolite Panteleimon (published on 18/3 and 19/3 respectively) cause the indignation of A. Karkayiannis, who returns to this question in a 12/3 article entitled "God forgive me!" There he points out: "Our minimal and obvious interest is to respect all these heterogeneities. Our maximal interest would be to look after them and to preserve them as integral parts of our truly great history. The Catholic communities in the Cyclades are a valuable historical remnant which should not sink in the sea of the majority".

The decisions taken by two community presidents to take drastic measures against the Albanian immigrants who live and work in the greater region of their communities has set off the already ‘Albanophobic’ climate in the Greek media. This attitude was strengthened even more by the few incidents of violence by Albanians, as well as by non-Albanians. The report published in N. (18/3) is a typical example of this climate. The report is entitled "Families in the clutches of a dangerous gang." It refers to cases of robberies committed in 1993, 1996, 1997. "According to rough estimates 20 Greeks …prospective migrants correspond to each Albanian illegal migrant; knock them off before they do!" (E.T. 14/3).

There is, however, the presence of a different tendency as well. "It is true that there is a generalized belief that criminality is influenced by the uncontrolled illegal migration as well. It would, however, be an oversimplification to maintain that this is the only source or explanation for the phenomenon" (N. 10/3). "The reason for this is simple. The indices show an increase in crimes committed by ‘foreigners’ because these are the ones, which are solved, in their overwhelming majority. Whereas the other crimes, the perpetrators of which are Greeks, they are either never solved or hopelessly delayed" (Eth. 12/3). "Nevertheless, the permissible concern does not justify the hysteria against the foreigners. The existing data demonstrate that the share of foreigners in crime is minimal, even if the news reports and the propaganda of the Security Police mention the Albanians all the time. Anyway, this is not a reason for reactions against the aliens, because a section of them, driven also by unemployment, commits crimes" (El. 11/3). "Why do the reporters of certain (not a few) electronic media insist on the expression ‘the perpetrators, most probably Albanians…’ whenever they mention burglaries, thefts, etc.? Because they adopt this version, which is of course liked also by the police authorities for obvious reasons. Where does this ‘most probably’ come from? At any rate have the Greek burglars run away from our country all of a sudden? The relevant statistics show anything but that. Isn’t it so?" (El. 12/3). "It is unfair to lay the blame for all crimes on the foreigners who are in Greece and to use them as our alibi. Of course, foreigners have a share in criminality, as it is evident from the data processed by the Ministry of Public Order" [editorial, El. (13/3)]. "We, however, are not like them… We fought with shadows regarding names and Macedonian phantoms; we entrenched ourselves in our being ‘brotherless’ when the frontiers were breaking down and young Dorians were coming downwards; instantaneously we exploited them in order to have country homes built of stones… And then we discovered that the cheap labor force demands also schools for their children and social security stamps and some constitutional (according to our own Constitution) rights. And here we came upon a snag again" ["The city of the others" N. Xydakis, K. 94/3)]. "Respect for the rights of the aliens working in our country is not only a question of compassion and sensitivity, but also of interest whatever that means. It is a fact that the alien workers have contributed much to their host country. This is not only because immigrants accept jobs which have been abandoned by the Greeks. They are entitled, therefore, like any other worker, to protection and legitimate pay" (El. 8/3).

Albania and the Albanians

The references to Albania are scant this month. Among them is the critical position expressed by E.T. (27/3) on the occasion of the official Albanian reaction regarding the ‘slay-the-Albanians’ climate existing in the Greek media and in a section of the Greek society: "Which state, you cowards? The state which allows the ambassador of Skipitaria, which has received twice a tidy aid from Greece, to shout against some kind of a persecution of the Albanians, instead of pulling him by the ear and sending him back?" (E.T. 27/3).

Bulgaria and the Bulgarians

The presentation of Bulgaria is similar. Lately it has been limited to the economic pages of the Athens newspapers.

Although downplayed, the name issue comes back on every convenient opportunity. After the name comes the issue of the Macedonian minority, which Greece does not recognize officially. The reference made by the Spokesperson of the Greek government to ‘Macedonia of Skopje’ as a slip of the tongue, is assessed as the first step by the Simitis government towards reconciling the Greeks with the idea of a compromise solution to the disputed name issue. "The profound reaction by the opposition parties was set off by the so-called …accidental slip of the tongue made by the Spokesperson of the government, D. Reppas, who yesterday spoke about ‘Macedonia of Skopje’. Parallel to this, the Reppas’ statement was hurriedly ‘hailed’ by the state radio of Skopje late yesterday. It commented that for the first time ever a Greek government spokesperson called ‘Macedonia’ with its proper name, thus sending a message for a change in the attitude of Athens" (E.T. 5/3). Oftentimes, the issue is treated with some humor. The extract that follows satirizes the unwillingness to solve the issue officially. "The negotiation regarding the name of Skopje is not proceeding. But pay attention to this as well: the views of the neighbors regarding what is happening in Kosovo were made known -on the demand of Skopje- to the European Union, through us! And tomorrow their assistant minister of Foreign Affairs will come here for consultations" (N. 4/3).

There are milder positions in favor of an open compromise on the part of both sides, following the assessment that it would be best for Greece to close the affair at the smallest possible cost. "A (Skopjan) thorn now may not cause particular tensions. However, its being in abeyance surely facilitates all those who have in their minds destabilizing plans for the area. [It is] also a thorn the existence of which functions to a certain extent as a restraining factor regarding any mediating and stabilizing role to be played by Greece in the area. The largest section of our political leadership agrees with this reasoning, but they fear to accept the cost of an unavoidable compromise, and this is the worst part" (El. 5/3).

The case regarding the election of the president of the Foundation of Greek Culture is also directly related to the name issue. Four MPs of the ruling party voted down the candidate, Mr. Economidis, who was proposed by the Prime Minister. What was the reason for that? The reason was an earlier article of his in the ‘Vima’ newspaper, where he supported the right of the neighbors to self-determination. The opposition press uses the issue in order to ‘give a double blow’ to the government. The latter is criticized for being not patriotic enough, while the ruling party appears politically and ideologically divided. "Some of the fathers of the nation have fortunately remembered his notorious article in the ‘Vima’, through which he outbid on the right of our Northern neighbors to be ‘self-defined’ in any way they wish, namely, as ‘Macedonians’" (E.T. 6/3). The pro-government press appears to be more conciliatory. "Those, who will read the entire article by professor Economidis in good faith will admit, even if they disagree, that he documents his scientific viewpoint with data and arguments. It would have been good, had been taken into account by the entire political leadership a long time ago" (E. 6/3). "As his scientific competence commanded him, Mr. Economidis has written an article regarding Skopje and the name. Naturally, he said what everywhere is considered self-evident: that only by means of violence will the Skopjans (and anybody else) change their name. Because if the name is our own soul, it is also the others’ soul too" (K. 6/3). It is with particularly positive comments that the Greek press, in its majority, hails the production, for the first time in Greece, of a play written by a Macedonian writer. "It is the first time that a play written by someone from Skopje is produced at an Athens theater. Observing the proportions, the performance of the ‘Powder-keg’ along with the film ‘Miroupafsim’ made by G. Korras and Ch. Voupouras, are two shocking glances at the present-day Balkans which are worth sharing with their makers" (El. 4/3).

Romania and the Romanians

As the tradition goes, the reports on Romania are scant. Hints regarding the course of the economy of the country appear in the supplements on the international and European market.

The cautiousness shown by Greece regarding the questions of ethnic minorities is not exhausted exclusively and solely within the limits of the Greek State. On the contrary, this is a policy which is implemented also abroad, followed always by the fear of creating a precedent through Greece’s responsibility which could endanger the stability of the country, but also the stability in the generally turbulent Balkan region. What is concealed behind this reasoning is the minority in Thrace and the well-known scenarios about the flaring up of the Balkans in the Greek border region. This could be the reason behind the cautiousness, which has been shown in the past and still continues to be shown by a large section of the Greek journalistic and political world towards the situation in Kosovo and the whole situation after the break-up of Yugoslavia. The feelings of friendship and solidarity of the Greek public vis-a-vis Serbia remain almost invariable. The Greek mass media have also contributed to this. "A documentary, dealing with the war in Yugoslavia, caused the anger of the Greek Television Channel 1 viewers. That documentary presents the Serbs as ruthless murderers and as the only ones responsible for this war. In vain the switchboard girls of the state television were trying to justify the unjustifiable" (Eth. 7/3). Undoubtedly, there is a different climate in the Greek press regarding the immediate past of the Yugoslav crisis. S. Milosevic’s blunders are now commented on in a critical manner and the voices putting responsibilities regarding the recent war have been significantly strengthened. The responsibilities on the Serbian side are not concealed behind the common interests connecting the two traditional allies of the same religious denomination. There is increasing reference to the human rights of the Albanian community in Kosovo and criticism of the Milosevic regime. However, the Greek press systematically avoids the term ‘Albanian from Kosovo’ (which implies a different ethnic identity). Instead the term ‘Albanian-speaking’ is used (which simply implies a different language and not necessarily a different national consciousness). The following extracts are among the very scant exceptions. "The Kosovo Albanians - and not the ‘Albanian-speaking’ people, because in addition to a voice they have also an origin which is Albanian and a consciousness which is Albanian" [N. Voulelis, El. 22/3)] "It is only that. Many other things have also changed in the last fifty years. In Belgrade they did not want to understand this. The result was that there were hard-core Serb police with bullet-proof vests in every neighborhood. They would look at you sullenly until they decide to which category of people you belong: to their ‘own’ or to the ‘others’. The problem is that the ‘others’ are far too many: nine out of ten citizens who live in Kosovo belong to the ‘others’, they are Albanians" (El. 8/3).

On the face of it, the Greek press seems to be neutral. However, the vein of the articles is much more pro-Serb than what would be expected when taking into account the real situation in the area, the nature of the Yugoslav crisis and the many critical reports against Greece and its partiality towards the latest events. Notably, certain journalists who criticize the hypocritical attitude of the Greek political and journalistic establishment also point this out. "The imperceptibly pro-Serb feelings expressed during the initial days of the crisis by the majority of the mass media have flared up following the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Th. Pangalos, to Belgrade. Despite the fact that the activity of the Yugoslavian army in Kosovo was at its peak, our Minister appeared to be optimistic regarding the settlement of the problem, unlike his British counterpart, Robin Cook, who had left Belgrade the previous day ‘seriously concerned’. This was sufficient for our pro-Serbian feelings to erupt. Thus, the concealment of Serbia’s responsibilities and the absolution of the policies elaborated by Slobodan Milosevic are granted. Moreover, the return to the well-known theory of the machinations of third parties and the antagonism among them in order to broaden their influence in the area is incumbent. The difference in our assessment and that of our partners and allies should not be looked for in the inherent distrust and the discovery of ‘brothers’ through Orthodoxy, but in our inability to protect, let alone promote, our interests" (El. 9/3). "No television channel has shown any bodies. No photographer has imprinted any women and children being burnt alive. No journalist has witnessed the execution of the men above the age of 15. All this evidence is given by terrorized inhabitants who escaped from the massacre: anonymous human beings, therefore untrustworthy" (N. 10/3). Usually, the great majority of the publications are content with quoting arguments from both sides without any further comments. Indeed, this creates the impression of a reliable transmitting of events. At the same time very few newspapers avoid the stereotype traps. In regard to what is taking place in the area, the references to ‘terrorists’ and ‘extremists’ in essence support the Serb viewpoint. "The political dimension of the explosion in Kosovo is more or less known.

"You will surely ignore the strange dance set up by secret service agents, arms dealers and drug traffickers at the fringes of the extremist organizations. However, they play a leading role in the events in Kosovo and Tetovo," (V. 8/3). The mere adoption of the Serbian vocabulary –i.e. of the Serb definition of things- makes Greeks perceive an image, which does not correspond to reality. The ordinary Greek reader readily adopts the notion that violence by the Serbs against the Albanians is rationalized and legalized. "However, more than 2,100,000 people live in this region, 90% of them are of Albanian origin. This means that, in order to maintain order and implement the law, the uninterrupted presence of thousands of soldiers and policemen is required, as has been the case until now. But the 6,500 soldiers and the 13,000 heavily armed policemen are not sufficient for a region almost as large as Israel with a population that is so hostile towards them. (…) The appearance of the Kosovo Liberation Army, however, and the activity it has developed in the last year, have changed the facts. The ‘first shot’ was triggered by the assassination of four Serb policemen" (E.T. 8/3). "‘Whenever we made an attempt to enter the village, we were fired at. We had to exterminate them, as any police in the world would have done’, a high ranking police officer was saying. The same source says that many of the fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army have fled to the surrounding hills." (E.T. 9/3). The opposition conservative press is that which ‘recycles’ the argument of the anti-Serb sentiments of the USA, oversimplifying the situation and disorientating the public from the real facts. "Greek diplomatic circles are apprehensive at the attempt on the part of some US circles to ‘blackmail’ accomplished facts in Kosovo, by legalizing separatist tendencies on the basis of population predominance of a specific ethnic group. (…) No statements relevant to the perspective of secession of the Serbian Albanian-populated province were made. Nonetheless, all the sides recommended ‘a dialogue between the Serb government and the Albanians in Kosovo’, thus giving the impression that the latter constitute an ethnic, religious, cultural and also a geographical unity, separate from the remaining body of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (E.T. 4/3). "The USA threatens Serbia with war. Provocative pressures for immediate restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy." (E.T. 5/3). "The American Ambassador in Athens, N. Burns, went to an informal meeting with the Greek Minister of the Press. Reportedly, the American Ambassador did not consider the recent statements made by the Greek government as sufficiently …pro-Albanian! (…) The American diplomat did not fail to express the discontent of his government regarding an emerging ‘partiality’ in Milosevic’s favor in statements made by Greek government officials regarding Kosovo" (E.T. 7/3). "The tension in Kosovo brings about dangerous games on the part of the USA. It seems that the Americans did not learn anything from the Bosnian drama and the war in Yugoslavia. Their present attitude stirs up the tension in Kosovo. Thus the crisis may well get out of control. By encouraging the aspirations of the Kosovo Albanian-speaking people for extended autonomy, ‘they throw down the gauntlet’ to Belgrade. The latter will be obliged to react actively, thus causing a chain reaction in the West" (Eth. 8/3). There are also people who support the opposite position. "On the face of it the USA and the EU simply repeat the anti-Serb attitude which they have held since 1991. The present facts, however, are not like this. (…) The present Kosovo crisis is the result almost exclusively of Serb policy and not of external undermining activities." (K. 8/3).

Historical facts are also called forth, in order to justify who can kill whom in the area. The right to use violence is correlated with the historically vested control of the region. The Albanians’ presence in the region is thus attributed only to the fact that they were used by the Ottomans as "a counterweight of a solid mass -Muslim in their majority- to the presence of the ‘unfaithful’ Serbs in the heart of the Balkans" (E.T. 8/3). Thus "nobody in Washington goes out of their way in order to explain the reasons for the present day majority of Albanians in the Serb province. It seems that history, particularly if it exceeds the depth of two centuries, has a minimal importance in the elaboration of American policy’. (E.T. 8/3). Some journalists claim that "demands of an academic nature" come before human rights. "The truth is, however, that the Albanians in Kosovo do not have any demands of ‘an academic nature’. They do not ask for more political pluralism or for an upgrading of the economy in order to live more comfortably in a Yugoslav federation" (E.T. 8/3).

The conservative opposition press is again the one that evokes the ‘Greater Albanian Idea’ in order to make schemas through abstractions of the particular aspects of this question. "The confrontation in Kosovo brings out the absence of strategy in the Greek foreign policy. It is established that we were not prepared for the exaltation of Albanian nationalism or for the chain reactions which it can cause in the Balkans." (…) "History takes its revenge against us, in the sense that power in our country mocks at patriotism exactly at the time when Albanian nationalism is strengthened in Albania, in Skopje and in Serbia! And this is so even if we consider that we have the luxury to ignore Albanian nationalism. The crisis in Kosovo can give the opportunity to Ankara for a demonstration of strength in Thrace, in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus. It may consider it expedient to measure our resoluteness and our national resistance" (E.T. 5/3).

Oftentimes humanitarian interest is exhausted in simple mathematics. "If a slaughter between the Albanians, the Yugoslavs and the Skopjans breaks out in Kosovo (as the hawks all over the world want), then we will have an uncontrollable mass invasion into Greece. Tens of thousands of poverty-stricken refugees will come into our country which already gasps under the weight of one million -legal and illegal- immigrants, mostly Albanians" (E.T. 4/3).

The sometimes-selective recognition of human rights on the part of the West is stigmatized in favor of another selectivity, the one, which goes together with the Greek interests. "Greece has always had serious geo-strategical, historical, political and economic reasons to raise its voice for the protection of the territorial integrity of Serbia and against the secession of Kosovo. Most of the Western mass media that lament for the ‘poor Albanians’ should not mislead us. Everything related to ‘human rights’ and ‘repressed minorities’ is a put-off by the hegemonic powers. (…) The ‘love’ of the mighty ones for the ‘wronged Muslims’ in Bosnia, in Kosovo and in Thrace, for the ‘repressed Macedonians’ in Greece, etc. has come every now and then since 1990. This ‘love’ is hypocrisy of the worst sort. It is enough to have a glance at Kurdistan or Cyprus" [I. Khalkoutsis, international affairs expert, (E.T. 22/3)]. However, there are also people who support the opposite approach to the same issue. "In Kosovo, the violation of the Albanians’ human rights is blatant. Things have become even worse after the abolition of the autonomy given to the region in 1945 and reaffirmed in the 1974 Constitution." (El. 5/3). "Instead of making an attempt to defuse the crisis through dialogue and reconciliation, Belgrade consciously carries out the massacre of the Albanian population: 25 Albanians were killed by the Serb authorities during the week-end, 20 more on Thursday, and these are the official figures. Helicopters, armored cars and heavy guns are used by Belgrade in order to bomb Albanian villages suspected of being safe havens of armed guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army." (K. 8/3).

Greece’s signing of the joint Balkan communique in favor of the broad autonomy of the region in the framework of the existing borders provoked mixed reactions by the various papers. "Those who are well-informed maintain that co-signing of the text by Greece is a compromise for our country, as it constitutes a clear shift from our previous positions on the Kosovo crisis." (N. 10/3)

Similar are the assessments regarding the government coalition of the Serbian Socialists with the extreme right-wing nationalist V. Seselj. "Such a government of ‘National Unity,’ with the participation of both Left and Right-wingers, can take decisions on the future of Kosovo without being accused of treason. Now both sides can discuss and negotiate the essential issue, although Rugova is still playing his dangerous game and is looking for international mediators" (E.T. 29/3).

In conclusion one can say that from all media monitored El. is the only one which stays out of the ‘stereotype traps.’ This paper is careful with the wording of its articles and makes good use of sources on both sides of the issues discussed. V., N. and K. try to maintain some neutrality, whereas E.T. appears to be very pro-Serb.

Turkey and the Turks

Turkey’s anti-democratic practices are used in order to demonstrate the ‘barbarous profile’ of the ‘bad’ neighbor who is scheming against Greek national sovereignty. However, when referring to human rights violations, Greek papers are very selective. "Severe criticism on violations of human rights in Turkey are expressed by an American Congress Committee." (El. 5/3). In comparison, when a group of the same Committee visited the region of Greek Thrace in order to look into the problems of the Turkish minority there, this visit was criticized as "a local inspection of the USA." (El. 3/1).

The political situation in the country is used also to prove Turkey’s ‘non-European’ orientation. "The constitutionally protected presence of the Turkish military establishment at the rudder of developments in Turkey means that the latter cannot function as a classical Western democracy, not even as a former Communist state, but only as an ‘Anatolian’ one". (E.T. 29/3).

The National Day of Greece -celebrated in commemoration of the revolution against the Ottoman Empire- provoked a humorously critical comment regarding the intellectual level of the Turks. "In the years before the Revolution, umbrellas were not very much in fashion in the Balkans. Despite this, the Turks were most probably holding one umbrella each on the day that Allah decided to rain some brain. This is why they used almost exclusively Greeks in all the key posts, which required one to have over 5 grams of brain in order to do the job. The Greeks’ misfortune was twofold: Not only were they enslaved but also it fell upon their lot to be slaves of a nation of idiots. The insult was great. This is how the Revolution came about." (Eth. 22/3).