The Minority Rights Paradox

Panayote Elias Dimitras

(War Report, number 58, February-March 1998)

Ten years ago very few people were aware of the existence, let alone the problems, of most minorities in the Balkan South. The human rights debate in the region was centred on dictatorial regimes whose authoritarianism deprived their citizens of most, if not all fundamental rights, irrespective of their ethnic or religious identity. Turkey sometimes featured on the list of human rights abusers, its all-powerful military and the regular persecution of the opposition giving the country an image of an authoritarian regime little better than Yugoslavia.

Greece was perceived somewhat differently. The prevailing perception was that although her recent past (the 1967-1974 dictatorship) had been problematic, in the 1980s she was safely anchored in the Western world, politically liberal and apparently devoid of human rights problems, with the troubles that had plagued the country for most of its history now firmly in the past.

The only minority-related issue anyone was aware of was the brutal assimilationist policies of Bulgaria towards her Turkish citizens, as witnessed in the notorious "revivalist process" of the late 1980s, when the communist regime Turks were compelled Turks, sometimes with brutal force, by the communist regime to change their names into Bulgarian ones so as in an attempt to "revive" their supposed Bulgarian ancestry. The beginning of the Kurdish struggle in Turkey was also attracting some attention.

Things have changed dramatically since then. Those with an interest in the area detail at least half a dozen ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities in each country. Governments throughout the region, post-communist or not, have a reputation for varying degrees of intolerance towards their minorities. The problems of the Turks in Greece and in Macedonia are well-known; concern for the Albanian population in Macedonia has raised fears of the possibility of another Balkan confrontation; while the Greek minority in Albania almost brought the two countries to war. Not only Turkey but also Greece is seen as guilty of serious violations of minority rights, with discriminatory practices reminiscent of those once used by the military junta against its political opponents. These have included revocation of citizenship and prosecution for "deviating" opinions.

Minority and other human rights are much better covered in the media now. Minorities themselves are visible and vocal, while human rights organisations have grown, with many doing serious and credible work to remind their governments and the media of their obligations to respect human rights. International governmental organisations like the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe have produced documents guaranteeing minority rights and mechanisms to monitor states’ compliance, while the European Court of Human Rights is busier than ever.

The culture of minority rights has developed to an unprecedented extent. However reluctantly, all states know they have at least to pretend to be respectful of their minorities. Otherwise they risk being excluded from European or other international institutions—something that would harm their interests. In fact, the Council of Europe has developed a series of criteria for new and continuing members supposedly so stringent that some countries have been hampered in their efforts to meet them in full. If only such criteria were applied to the Council's old members, which are not necessarily human rights havens.

This is far from an "Era of Human Rights" for minorities, however. The apparently widespread interest in human and minority rights is rarely devoid of ulterior motives and thus subjected to ensuing limitations. It would be naive to believe that any country views respect for civil rights as a priority at home and abroad, and does not subjugate them to stability or narrow-minded national interests. Western countries, driven by anti-communist obsession, backed President Sali Berisha in Albania and played down NGO reports of his human rights violations. When, thanks to Berisha, the country finally collapsed into chaos in 1997, no-one in the West paused to reflect on what their unqualified support for him had meant. On the contrary, they had found a new affection for Macedonia's President Kiro Gligorov. Certainly, he is far from a Berisha-style authoritarian; but his country has not abandoned its one-party structure and mentality, and this has led to serious violations of the very principles espoused by the Macedonian constitution.

The international community’s obsession with Macedonia’s stability, regardless of its human rights problems, is rooted in the country’s large Albanian minority and the fact that it is adjacent to Kosovo. The 1997 Human Rights Report issued by the US State Department on Macedonia is remarkable for its many omissions, especially in comparison with reports on neighbouring countries. American diplomacy permits reference to the fact that Macedonian political organisations are banned in Bulgaria, but forgets to mention that the same thing happens with their Bulgarian equivalent in Macedonia, in spite of a recent well-publicised hunger strike by one of the group’s leaders. Worse, the trial in September 1997 of the ethnic Albanian mayor of Gostivar and his 13-year prison sentence are also omitted. This is in spite of NGO condemnation of his two-month detention, the unfair trial and its outcome. It was probably thanks to this sort of protest that the state security forces decided to free the mayor until his appeal is heard and the courts courts' "forgot" to set a date for the hearing. In contrast the Greek chapter of the US report regularly includes references to similar political trials.

Nevertheless, this absence of sincere commitment to human and minority rights is not the main reason why minorities cannot expect a brighter future in the Balkan South (and probably elsewhere). In spite of the growth of a culture of minority rights in society as a whole, there is virtually no minority rights-based political culture within the minorities themselves. Minority organisations and the leaders who articulate minority agendas appear to be driven mostly by ethno-national aspirations rather than by any deep-rooted respect for civic rights. To them, human rights are often just a tool for the achievement of their aims, as they are for most states. And minorities are unfortunately drawn into aping the behaviour of such states: to the latter's hegemonic and aggressive nationalism, minorities usually respond with various sorts of defensive and peripheral, if not parochial, nationalism, equally exclusive and intolerant. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is an extreme but very eloquent example of this tendency: its ruthless and repressive methods are a mirror image of those used by the Turkish armed forces.

Minorities' unwillingness to see each other's demands as similar and thus struggle together to achieve them is a further obstacle to progress. Even formally trans-minority parties, like those in Albania and Bulgaria, function more as vehicles for the interest of one minority, in this case the Greeks in Albania and the Turks in Bulgaria. In both cases, Greek and Turkish minority leaders have stated that there is no Macedonian nation and no Macedonian minority in their countries, aligning themselves with the hegemonic nationalism of Greece and Bulgaria. Minority groups in Greece also hope that by placating the country's intolerant nationalism they will improve their situation there. To this end Greek Catholics and Greek Jews have sent appeals to their fellow believers around the world stressing the "historical" Greek character of Macedonia; the Jews even based their arguments on their ancient holy books. Aromanians (Vlachs) and Arberor (Arvanites) refuse to join forces with Macedonians (and Turks) to enable Greece, like all other EU countries, to get a national office of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages. Even the Roma, much despised by the Greek state, have rallied to the struggle with among other things lyrical contributions on the Greekness of Macedonia. They are also reluctant to work with international Romany organisations which, they have been led to believe, are suspect and potentially "anti-Greek".

Some minorities simply adhere to the nationalism of their corresponding "mother" nation, thus becoming easy targets for charges of separatism if not of acting as foreign agents. It is no secret that Turkish minority policy in Greek Thrace is influenced if not shaped by the Turkish Consulate there; just as Greek minority policy-making in Albania is focused on the Greek embassy in Tirana and the consulate in Gjirokastra. To a lesser extent, similar ties exist between Macedonia's Albanians and political forces, sometimes even the government, in Albania. Bulgaria’s Turks have a comparable relationship with Turkey. Only Macedonia appears to shy away from such privileged relations with her minorities in neighbouring countries—and is consequently accused of "betrayal" by the Macedonian diaspora.

The absence of links between a minority and its homeland does not automatically make these minorities more realistic or devoid of nationalist leanings, however. The Macedonian political movement in Bulgaria is separatist and maximalist, a position which has not helped them make substantial inroads into Bulgarian society. Greece's Macedonian activists represent a wide range of beliefs, from convinced pro-Europeans to fundamentalist nationalists. Luckily for them, the pro-European voices have been predominant and so many Greeks have come to sympathise with their struggle, indeed to accept what is otherwise a "national taboo"—the existence of such a minority. In turn Greek Macedonian problems get wider international attention than those of their counterparts in Bulgaria, even though the latter suffer a worse form of repression.

The confluence of these two tendencies—resorting to nationalism and reliance upon the mother nation's uncritical support—is probably the main reason why minorities in the Balkan South lack charismatic but at the same time pragmatic leaderships. Moreover, in the rare case of such a leader, for example Arben Xhaferi, president of the Democratic Party of Albanians in Macedonia, every effort possible has been deployed to disarm him politically. In the words of a Western human rights activist, he is "the victim of the oldest political trick: label your enemies as extreme. In fact, his demands are quite reasonable and I am inclined to believe that he is trying to control the more radical elements around him. Most Macedonian politicians, and my country's ambassador, however, view his claims of looming radicalisation as a threat."

Some may claim that there is nothing surprising in the fact that the "human and minority rights revolution" of the 1990s has not helped create a human rights culture among minorities, let alone majorities. It looks like a repetition of the trends of two centuries ago: when the "democratic revolutions" ushered in civic rights in modern societies, while the regimes that established themselves at the time were driven mostly by ethno-nationalism and sometimes used democracy as a mere tool. Minorities can be heartened by this analogy: by the fact that, nevertheless, democracy has spread since and permeated more and more modern societies, more often in spite of, and not because of the leaderships that have helped shape them. But it is difficult to imagine that minority rights could regress as they did in the half century dominated by the Cold War. Progress in minority human rights will greatly depend on the development of strong democratic societies in which the concept of individual rights is entrenched. Such rights will certainly have to be "extracted" from those states which are solidly rooted in often very intolerant ethno-nationalism.